Establishing security and privacy policies for an on-line auction by Meiners, Michael Allan
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
1-1-2001 
Establishing security and privacy policies for an on-line auction 
Michael Allan Meiners 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd 
Recommended Citation 
Meiners, Michael Allan, "Establishing security and privacy policies for an on-line auction" (2001). 
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 21446. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/21446 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses 
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
Establishing security and privacy policies for an on-line auction 
by 
Michael Allan Meiners 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Computer Engineering 
Major Professor: Doug Jacobson 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2001 
Copyright © Michael Allan Meiners, 2001. All rights reserved. 
11 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the Master's thesis of 
Michael Allan Meiners 
has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................. V 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... vi 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ vii 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction to Online Security .................................................................................. 2 
1.2 How Security Fits The Bill ........................................................................................ 3 
1. 3 The Need For Security ............................................................................................... 4 
2. SECURITY BASICS ....................................................................................................... 8 
2.1 Encryption ................................................................................................................... 8 
2.1.1 Symmetric Encryption ........................................................................................ 9 
2.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption ...................................................................................... 9 
2.1.3 Other benefits of encryption ............................................................................. 10 
2.2 Hash Values ............................................................................................................. 11 
2.3 Secure Sockets Layer ............................................................................................... 11 
2.4 Virtual Private Networks ......................................................................................... 12 
2.5 Firewalls and Intrusion Detection ............................................................................ 14 
2.6 Ensuring Availability ............................................................................................... 14 
3. PREVENTION ............................................................................................................... 18 
3.1 Scalability ................................................................................................................. 19 
3 .1.1 Load Balancing ................................................................................................. 19 
3.1.2 SSL Acceleration .............................................................................................. 21 
3 .1.3 Server Accelerators and Cache Servers ............................................................ 22 
3.2 Availability ................................................................................................................ 24 
3.2.1 Some Solutions for Preventing or Countering DDoS Attacks .......................... 26 
3 .2.2 DoS Checker ..................................................................................................... 27 
3.2.3 Extending the Auction in Case of a DDoS Attack ............................................ 28 
3.3 Thwarting Hackers ................................................................................................... 29 
3.3.1 Security through Obscurity ............................................................................... 29 
lV 
3.3.2 Eliminate Unneeded Protocols and Programs ................................................... 30 
3 .3 .3 Enforce Authentication Measures ..................................................................... 32 
3.3.4 Monitor Network for Vulnerabilities ................................................................ 35 
3.3.5 Prevent Viruses and Trojans ............................................................................. 37 
3.3.6 Avoid Web Site Defacement.. ........................................................................... 38 
3.3.7 Preventing Damage by Insiders ........................................................................ 39 
3.3.8 Inverted Security ............................................................................................... 40 
3.3.9 Securing the Database ....................................................................................... 42 
3 .3 .10 Choosing the Right OS and Web platform ..................................................... 44 
3.4 Preventing Auction Fraud ........................................................................................ 46 
3.4.1 Common Problems and Approaches to Auction Fraud .................................... 47 
3.4.2 Autormtic Pricing and Rating System .............................................................. 49 
3.4.3 Other Ways of Reducing Fraud ........................................................................ 53 
3.5 Security and Privacy Policies ................................................................................... 55 
3.5.1 Security Policy .................................................................................................. 55 
3.5.2 Privacy Policy ................................................................................................... 58 
4. DETECTION ................................................................................................................. 63 
5. RESPONSE .................................................................................................................... 68 
6. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................ 75 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 7 6 
V 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Distributed-Systems Attack .................................................................................... 16 
Figure 2: Simple network with load balancer ........................................................................ 20 
Figure 3: Performance impact of SSL session key caching (source: Cisco) ......................... 21 
Figure 4: Advanced network configuration, with caching servers and SSL accelerators ..... 23 
Figure 5: DoS checker ............................................................................................................ 27 
Figure 6: Secure admin login with SSH ................................................................................. 32 
Figure 7: Quality Assurance server ........................................................................................ 36 
Figure 8: Levels of security based on risk (source: @Stake) ................................................. 41 
Figure 9: Complexity vs. effectiveness .................................................................................. 41 
Figure 10: Market share for Web servers August 1995 - April 2001 (source: Netcraft) ....... 46 
Figure 11: Network Sniffer .................................................................................................... 66 
Vl 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Statistics and costs of common computer crimes ...................................................... 5 
Table 2: Sites worldwide by server type ................................................................................ 46 
Table 3: Manual feedback system with number and percentage ofresponses ...................... 50 
Table 4: Credit range for each user level.. ............................................................................. 52 
Vll 
ABSTRACT 
The current Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) project is a proposal to use business-
to-business electronic commerce to provide a means of developing markets for end-of-life 
products and their components. The objective is to develop a science and technology base 
for a scalable and secure hub for reverse logistics e-commerce in which users can buy and 
sell used or surplus products, components, and materials as well as provide a service for 
disposing of them responsibly. A critical part of the project is the design of a security 
architecture, as well as security and privacy policies for the project's on-line electronic 
marketplace. 
Security for the auction website should focus on three concerns: prevention, 
detection, and response. Prevention consists of four basic characteristics of computer 
security: authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We will also analyze 
some of the vulnerabilities and common attacks of sites on the web, and ways to defend 
against them. Detection involves several approaches to monitor traffic on the internal 
network and log the activities of users. This is important to provide forensic evidence when 
a site is compromised. Detection, however, is useless without some type of response, either 
through patching new-found security holes, contacting vendors to report security weaknesses 
and new viruses, or contacting local and federal agencies to assist in closing those holes or 
bringing violators to justice. 
We will look at these issues, as well as trust in auctions - allowing buyers and sellers 
to determine if a user if trustworthy or not - and automatic schemes for preventing a 
fraudulent user from exploiting that trust. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) project, which guided the 
security architecture presented in this thesis, is to provide a means of exchanging end-of- life 
products. This is accomplished through an auction W eh site that allows various companies 
to sell and buy these products online. 
However, malicious users and fraudulent businesses may take advantage of the open 
environment for sharing these products since potentially large financial transactions could 
pass through the site. They may be intent on stealing financial information, or stealing user 
information and destroying the credibility built by other businesses. The increasing 
frequency of Denial of Service attacks staged against popular sites may encourage them to 
disrupt the site to deny access to it by others, or disrupt server operations at an opportune 
time to turn an auction in their favor. Or, in the spirit of traditional crime, they may commit 
fraud for financial gain. A critical part of the project is to provide a security architecture and 
security and privacy policies for the online electronic marketplace to diminish these attacks. 
Good security should prevent these behaviors as much as possible to limit damage 
done to both the site and users. No defense is perfect, however, and cannot possibly predict 
all future attacks. Those sites that rely solely on preventative measll.1:°es will be burned 
repeatedly by similar attacks once a security vulnerability has been exploited. If a site is 
oblivious to the fact that an attack is occurring, the attacker may install a backdoor into the 
system for later access, or may share his knowledge of the exploit with others who will 
continue to jeopardize the system. Good security practices therefore include a means of 
detecting an intrusion or attack and a way of responding to it to guarantee that it does not 
happen again. Many of the security approaches mentioned pertain to defending a Web server 
in general, but some can be utilized specifically for securing auction sites. 
It is also essential to maintain the trust between users and ensure that they will return 
to the site to increase the effectiveness and appeal of the site to attract more businesses, and 
extend its benefits to other interested parties. Availability of the site, protecting the sensitive 
information of users and reducing the likelihood of fraud all play a factor in increasing and 
retaining users. 
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1.1 Introduction to Online Security 
It is surprising that a project conceived by a group in the Defense Department had 
little to no actual defenses built into it from the beginning to provide for network security. 
But it's safe to say that the scope of the Internet has changed from its inception as a shared 
information network within the Defense Departments Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
to what exists and is frequented by millions of people today. The Internet began as an open 
network linking universities and research centers across the world. At that time, the network 
was a means of distributing free information around the globe, and gave little concern to 
securing the network of interactions between trusting computers. But as it grew, businesses 
began to see the potential of this new medium to reach unprecedented numbers of consumers. 
As this happened, commerce crossed from the bricks-and-mortar stores that costumers were 
used to visiting, to the on-line, and global, world of impersonal computer protocols and 
services. It is exactly this global reach, ease of service, and the feeling of anonymity that 
draws the customers, and the hackers to on-line businesses. As commerce, big-name brands, 
and large amounts of electronic money began to flow across the Internet, the traditional 
crimes of fraud, theft, and vandalism flowed with it. Over the past decade as the Web has 
expanded the reaches of businesses, security for this quickly changing technology has 
struggled to keep up, to patch the holes that criminals open on the network. 
Despite the best efforts of security specialists, the number of vulnerabilities and 
breaches appears to be increasing over time. Their attempts are countered by the vast 
dissemination of hacking exploits on the Web and the ability of newcomers to modify or 
reuse those exploits. Often experienced hackers devise a new security threat and play with 
insecure systems. Script-kiddies then pick up where they left off, using readily available 
software downloaded off the Internet to stage "point-and-click" attacks on vulnerable Web 
sites. Many are simply acts of vandalism, such as the attacks that stalled service to Yahoo! 
and Amazon.com. Others are motivated by the attraction of gaining access to a system that is 
forbidden. Still other attacks involve a desire for profit or industrial espionage and are 
usually more sophisticated. As long as there are W eh sites that are available to a large 
number of people, chances are good that those sites will be attacked. 
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1.2 How Security Fits The Bill 
As Bruce Schneier says in his book "Secrets and Lies" [ScOO], good security 
encompasses prevention, detection and reaction. Digital security tends to rely mainly on 
prevention with firewalls and encryption. There's usually no detection, and there's almost 
never any response, since companies fear publicity and loss of control that might arise from 
reporting an incident. Media attention about major break-ins, credit card number thefts, and 
denials or service have only deepened that fear. A strategy focusing on prevention alone, 
will only work if the prevention mechanisms are perfect. In theory, that is a fine assumption, 
but in practice, no prevention mechanism is perfect, and therefore people will find a way 
around it. When they do, prevention is then useless and justice or reparations must be 
pursued. This requires detection of the intruder to determine who is responsible, and a 
reaction to determine the extent of losses and see that the perpetrator will not strike again. 
Prevention, however, is the first and most important step, since irrepairable damage 
can be caused by a break-in or theft, and may result in loss of confidence experienced by 
consumers. A key to preventing security breaches is a well defined security policy since 
even the most bulletproof security measures can be rendered useless without realistic solid 
policies defined and implemented. Encryption is a very important part of the prevention 
puzzle, ensuring that transmissions are scrambled, and sensitive data stored on the system is 
protected. Very few intruders would bother to spend the time or resources to break even the 
most simple encryption, unless they were guaranteed a big pay-off. Firewalls and restricted 
access are another good measure, but are often susceptible to misconfiguration and human 
error. Programming bugs and glitches, as well as social engineering and insider attacks are 
targeted again toward human error and misplaced trust. Because of these problems, 
prevention can only go so far. It must be followed by detection. 
Currently, the most widespread means of detection are security logs and audit trails. 
These can capture valuable data about where an attacker is coming from, what they've done 
while inside the system, and sometimes every key they pressed. It is important to prevent 
attackers from tampering with or deleting these logs so they can't damage a system and then 
make a clean getaway. Another way to check for modifications by intruders is to store write-
protected checksums of system files, alerting administrators of possible attacks when critical 
4 
files are altered. Intrusion detection systems provide a means of catching a hacker in the act, 
and can warn administrators when an attack occurs by comparing unusual network activity to 
known attack signatures. 
Finally, tracking intruders is pointless without a means of response. This response 
could include patching the holes exploited by the attacker and updating security protocols, 
software, and hardware. A minor attack, orchestrated by one person, could be dealt with by 
contacting the ISP of the person and having them block his account. A serious and costly 
offense may require more extreme measures to stop a persistent hacker, such as contacting 
the FBI and other authorities who can pursue and capture the offender. No defensive 
measure is perfect, and hackers will find a way inside. Security is a constant battle, and 
detection of new exploits and fixes that stop them is a necessary step in making a system 
more secure. 
1.3 The Need For Security 
There are many cases in the media today that point out the sad state of on-line 
security. Many companies do not look seriously into computer security until they have been 
attacked and have lost potential business or faced embarrassment after sensitive data was 
exposed. Others have been caught with their pants down for failing to keep up on the latest 
security patches. When such sites become popular and have obvious security holes, hackers 
are drawn to them. The number of sites under fire from hackers is staggering. At year-end 
2000, the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) registered a whopping 17,672 
incidents ofhacking -- up from less than 10,000 in 1999 [InOl]. These statistics cover 
network break-ins (which may give access to data files), Web site vandalism, DoS attacks, 
and theft of data. And those are just the recorded cases. Many companies, afraid of negative 
publicity, don't report the attacks. The FBI estimates that businesses worldwide lost $1.5 
trillion in year 2000 due to internal and external security breaches [ZeOl]. Table 1 shows the 
financial losses of some of the most common attacks. This data was gathered from 1999 
research conducted by the Computer Security Institute and the FBI, covering 521 companies, 
organizations and educational institutions [KrO 1]. 
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Table 1: Statistics and costs of common computer crimes 
I .. ~heft. ~f .. ~.ropriet~?'. inf~r~~tion I .. ~.~~ I $1.848.000 
......... 11 ..... ~1·1·~'.??.? 
I .1 nsider abuse of ~et ac?~s~ · 1. ~7% ... 
:I $103,ooo 
T$~3~5i~-
. ...... JI. ~8!,D??. 
When security falls behind, sensitive company and personal data can be at risk. Some 
sensitive data contains company secrets and information that should not be made available to 
outside competition. The American Society for Industrial Security reports that Fortune 1,000 
companies lost more than $45 billion in trade secrets stolen by hackers in 1999 alone [RuO 1]. 
FBI statistics reveal that more than 100 nations engage in corporate espionage against U.S. 
companies. In 1997, more than 1,100 documented incidents of economic espionage and 550 
suspected incidents were reported [HC98]. 
In other cases, unauthorized acquisition of personal data pertaining to customers and 
users has been used for theft, extortion or to drive customers away from on-line sites. Many 
are after an easy score. Some may eavesdrop on individual customer transactions, but few 
hackers will even attempt to sniff and decipher even 40-bit SSL transactions when this 
encryption is in place and used correctly. Others vent their anger at a site, or experiment 
with automated software that they downloaded, to conduct a DoS attack and bring a well-
know site to its knees, driving frustrated customers away. 
Script kiddies may get a lot of attention, but the most dangerous hackers are the ones 
who move quietly behind the scenes - criminal hackers. They are sometimes sponsored by 
well-funded organized crime groups and are more likely to systematically probe for a 
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security hole at a single site, or attempt to break encrypted transactions or databases. The pot 
of gold is the unprotected, unencrypted database that stores credit card or billing information 
for hundreds or thousands of users. There are groups like the Russian crackers who stole $10 
million from Citibank in 1994. In January 2000, a hacker named "Maxus" tapped into the 
customer database of CD Universe, extracted up to 350,000 credit cards, and demanded 
$100,000 from the company. When CD Universe refused, Maxus posted access to the 
database on his W eh site. In another case, two Russian hackers compromised more than one 
million credit card numbers during multiple extortion attempts against US-based e-
businesses. They used commonly known and usually easily repaired security holes in mostly 
Microsoft e-commerce products to extort money from companies. If the companies refused 
to pay for the repairs, the hackers would pass stored credit card information on to the Russian 
Mafia. An attack against Creditcards.com in December 2000, resulted in the theft of about 
55,000 credit-card numbers from its Web site. More than 25,000 of the numbers were 
exposed on the Internet after the company ignored a $100,000 extortion attempt believed to 
have come from a Russian hacker. In yet another recent case, hackers were thought to have 
accessed the database of Egghead.com containing user information and credit card numbers 
in December 2000. It took several weeks to discover that database had not been 
compromised. A company with good security and logging capability should have been able 
to determine the extent of the intrusion within a few days, security specialists say. In this 
case, that may have saved banks and credit unions the millions of dollars it was estimated to 
have cost them in what was, according to Egghead, ultimately an unnecessary effort to cancel 
the cards. And these are only a few of the many security breaches that occur each year. 
Fraud is also a concern, especially with auction W eh sites, denying both companies 
and users of payments as well as goods, and destroying user trust. Internet fraud accounted 
for $3 .2 million in 1999 alone. The FTC received in excess of 18,700 complaints in 1999, 
and that jumped to almost 21,400 in 2000. Visa reported that total fraud is around seven 
cents for every $100 processed, but it's 24 cents for each $100 processed through Web sites 
[HuOl]. 
Auction sites have been the primary means of fraud on the Internet for the past 
several years. In 2000, auction sites accounted for 78% of Internet fraud reports. Over 87% 
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of Internet fraud complaints came from auction sites in 1999, up from 68% the year before 
[WiOO]. According to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, non-delivery of goods is the 
primary cause of complaint. Users could contact the Better Business Bureau if the offending 
entity is a business, or talk to the police in the offenders area. Often times, though, Law 
Enforcement Agencies are too busy to handle the claims, especially since most fraud claims 
are low dollar amounts and not worth the time to pursue. 
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2. SECURITY BASICS 
The Internet is perhaps the most complex system ever developed. It contains millions 
of computers, connecting hundreds of millions of users over a network of mismatched 
components. Each computer can have hundreds of applications running on it, accepting 
input from users who may not have the best intentions. Security is an attempt to allow access 
to helpful information and services to the good guys, while barring entry to those who would 
abuse it. 
2.1 Encryption 
Commerce online is vital to the economy today, and encryption is vital to online 
commerce. Without encryption, we could not be sure that our credit card or personal 
information is held in confidence between only us and the company with which we do 
business. Nor could we be assured that the information will remain private once it is 
accepted by the server and stored in an online database. We would not be capable of 
validating the identity of an online merchant, nor the creator of a message that was sent to us. 
Encryption, however, allows us to do all these things and more. It can be a means of keeping 
data private (confidentiality), verifying the identity of users and businesses (authentication), 
and preventing modification of crucial records (integrity). Threats common to the non-
digital world, such as interception of messages and transactions, data alteration and 
fabrication, and false identity can be overcome with properly implemented security and 
encryption. 
The main idea behind encryption is that a group of people can use private information 
(keys) to keep written messages secret from everyone else. A readable message, called 
plaintext, is what someone wants to keep secure. Let's say two people, Alice and Bob, want 
to share a message without anyone else knowing what it is. Alice transforms the message 
into ciphertext using an encryption algorithm. The ciphertext message is gibberish to anyone 
else who might happen to look at. Alice gives the ciphertext to Bob who, using the same 
algorithm and the correct information, can then decipher the message. 
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There are two main types of encryption that Bob and Alice as well as online business 
can use to implement security - symmetric and asymmetric encryption. There are benefits 
and drawbacks for using both. 
2.1.1 Symmetric Encryption 
Symmetric encryption uses the same key to both encrypt and decrypt the message, 
and is usually very fast and efficient at this. In the above example, Alice and Bob have 
already agreed on the same encryption/decryption algorithm to use, but the key is what 
decides how the algorithm should scramble the message. Alice can choose the key with 
which to encrypt the message, but Bob also has to know what that key is to decrypt and read 
it. If Alice cannot simply hand-deliver the key to Bob without someone else getting a copy, 
then this presents a problem. How then, does Bob acquire the key? Another problem arises 
with group communications. If Carla wants to join Alice and Bob, she also needs a copy of 
the key. But what if she wants to send a message only to Alice? She would need a separate 
key to do this. Between the three of them, they would need three separate keys, just to talk to 
each other separately, and a fourth to talk as a group. Ifwe expand the group to include ten 
people, we now need 45 keys just for confidential two-person communications, and many 
more for group sessions of more than two people. Expand the group to 100 people and the 
network needs 4,950 different keys. As the number of people on the network gets larger, the 
number of keys required for every possible communication between users grows 
exponentially. 
2.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
Asymmetric encryption solves both these problems. As before, the algorithm is 
agreed on before hand, but this time, instead of using a single secret key that both Alice and 
Bob agree on, each chooses a private and a public key pair, such that the private key will 
encrypt a message and the public key will decrypt it. Then they publish their public keys for 
all the other users to see, while sharing their private keys with no one. The two keys are 
different, and one cannot be computed from the other. Now, when Alice wishes to send a 
message to Bob, she encrypts the message with Bob's public key. Bob, upon receiving the 
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message, can only decrypt it with his private key. This solves the problem with exponential 
key growth because each person only needs to know their pair of keys and the public keys of 
all other users with whom they want to communicate. Thus, for 100 people, we can get by 
on only 200 keys - two for each person. 
An added bonus of this system is authentication. This is especially important, since 
in modem business, authentication is more important than secrecy. If Alice wants to make 
sure that no one else sends messages to Bob claiming to be her, she can sign her message by 
first encrypting it with her private key, and then further encrypting it with Bob's public key. 
This way, Bob can only read the message by decrypting it with his private key and then 
decrypting it again with Alice's public key. Thus, Alice can ensure that only Bob knows 
what the message says, and Bob can verify that Alice sent it because he had to use her public 
key to complete the decryption process, which was started by her private key that only she 
knows. 
One drawback to asymmetric encryption is that it is very computationally expensive. 
It involves modular arithmetic, exponentiation, and large prime numbers thousands of bits 
long. For this reason it is never used to encrypt entire messages. Instead it is employed to 
encrypt a symmetric key that can then be used for fast, subsequent encrypted 
communications. Several asymmetric algorithms are currently in use. RSA is the most 
popular. The US government's Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is also frequently used, 
as well as ElGamal signatures, and elliptic curve algorithms. 1,024-bit keys are common in 
public-key algorithms, whereas 128-bit keys are the standard for symmetric encryption using 
such algorithms as the Data Encryption Standard (DES) (and triple-DES), RCS, IDEA, and 
Blowfish. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) will soon be the government's 
standard symmetric encryption algorithm. 
2.1.3 Other benefits of encryption 
Besides providing for confidentiality and authentication as noted above, encryption 
can also present a means of checking the integrity of a message. If someone, even though he 
cannot understand the contents of a message, happens to intercept it on its way from Alice to 
Bob, and attempts to modify or delete parts of the message, this will be clearly evident to 
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Bob who will not be able to decrypt part or all of the message. The modified portion will 
look garbled or will register as a transmission error, and Bob will request that Alice send the 
message again. 
2.2 Hash Values 
Hash algorithms are also very useful to ensure the integrity of a message. One-way 
hash functions act like digital fingerprints: small pieces of data used to identify larger data. 
There are no keys involved to create a hash function, but the idea is that it is very difficult to 
forge them. For instance, Alice could create a message, compute the hash of the message, 
then send both the message and the hash value to Bob. Bob then looks at the message he 
receives, computes his own hash value of it, establishes that the two values match and 
therefore determines that the message was not modified in transit. He knows that, given the 
hash of the message, it is computationally unfeasible to create another message that hashes to 
the same value or to derive the original message from the hash. Alice could sign the hash 
value for further protection. Common one-way hash functions in use today include SHA-1 
(Standard Hash Algorithm) the U.S. government's standard hash function; RIPEMD-160, a 
European algorithm; and MD5 which is usually not used for new applications. 
2.3 Secure Sockets Layer 
When users browse a Web site, they are often viewing it in plain HTML format. This 
is fine for information that is not sensitive in nature. But in some cases when the user would 
like to buy something over the Internet, or logon to a Web server to authenticate himself or 
access private information, he may be fearful that the private information entered could be 
viewed by other people and then used against him. To solve this problem, early versions of 
Netscape Navigator included a protocol named Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Today, SSL is 
by far the most widely deployed security protocol in the world, supported in all major Web 
browsers. This protocol, which will eventually be renamed Transport Layer Security (TLS), 
provides authentication and encryption for Web connections. When an SSL-capable 
browser, such as Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer, wants to communicate 
with a Web server (Apache, Microsoft Internet Information Server), the two sides can do so 
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securely. Each can confirm the other's identity using digital certificates. Digital certificates 
are issued by trusted third parties, called Certificate Authorities (CAs), and are used to create 
public keys. Most major browsers contain the certificates of root CAs. Thus, when a server 
sends its certificate to the client, if it is a valid certificate it has been signed by a CA. The 
client can then trace the certificate from the server back through each CA until it reaches the 
certificate of a root CA that was included with the distribution of the browser. 
To begin communications, the client and server first establish which algorithm to use. 
Encryption algorithms can be explicitly configured or negotiated for each session, with the 
most widely used standards being DES and RC4. When this is completed, the server sends 
its certificate and public key to the client's browser to verify the server's identity. The client 
then generates a symmetric key to encrypt the flow of information for further 
communications, encrypts it with the server's public key and sends this information to the 
server. Once this start-up process is complete, a secure tunnel is established and private data 
transmission can begin. 
While the initial authentication and key generation are transparent to users, they are 
far from transparent to Web servers. This process must be performed for each user session, 
placing a major load on server CPU resources and creating severe performance bottlenecks. 
Since SSL makes use of public-key cryptography, it is slow by nature. A standard Web 
server, for example, can handle only 1 % to 10% of its normal load when processing SSL 
sessions. 
Although it is most commonly used for securing W eh traffic through the steps 
illustrated above, SSL can secure a wide variety of other traffic as well. File transfer using 
FTP, e-mail transmissions (SMTP), and remote terminal service (Telnet) can all be secured 
with SSL and its successor, TLS. Eric Rescorla, in his book SSL and TLS, describes the SSL 
protocol in detail and describes how it can be used with other protocols to enhance security 
[ReOl]. 
2.4 Virtual Private Networks 
Like SSL, Virtual Private Networks, or VPNs, afford users a secure encrypted tunnel 
over an unsecure network. Like SSL, VPN s use encryption protocols to protect the 
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transmitted data. The most common protocol used is Ipsec, which stands for IP security 
protocol, and is the standard for protecting IP traffic using cryptography on the packet level. 
Encrypted VPNs generally serves two purposes - to connect two portions of a network at two 
separate locations, or to provide a remote connection to the network by mobile users. It's the 
first use that will be beneficial to the auction W eh site when the system needs to expand and 
branch out to other networks, expanding the number of access points to the Internet 
Though VPNs and SSL encrypt information so it can be sent securely to the server, 
encryption can't solve all the problems, and sometimes it presents problems of its own. 
Encryption is great in theory, but is often less secure in practice. Bugs or omissions in the 
protocol could eliminate the security of the message, or man-in-the-middle attacks could 
render a security protocol less effective. Usually though, for individual user information, 
hackers will not spend the time to break even weak encryption. Many companies boast that 
they have greatly improved security by increasing the number of bits in the keys used to 
encrypt the data sent to the server. This is an error in their logic. Bruce Schneier presents 
the problem this way: Compare encryption to the lock on the door to your house. A standard 
lock has only so many different keys that are produced with it. If a burglar acquires all the 
keys for that particular lock and tries them all in a row (a brute-force approach), it may take 
him 3 days to find the correct key to unlock the door. Now, if a salesman tries to sell you a 
new lock that has ten times the number of different keys that are produced with it, and states 
that it would now take that burglar three years, would this make you feel more secure? 
Probably not, because no burglar would stand at your doorstep for three days and try all the 
keys anyway. He'd find another way in. A house with one locked door and dozens of open 
windows would be an easy target for burglars. The same is true with computer systems. 
Most hackers would not consider cracking even the simplest encryption. In our case, SSL 
and VPNs cover the security at the door, but do nothing to protect the data on the server. In 
the past couple years there have been many reported cases of hackers breaking into Web sites 
and stealing personal or financial information. SSL does nothing to prevent this. Security 
must cover the locked doors as well as the open windows. This is where other means of 
intrusion prevention come in. 
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2.5 Firewalls and Intrusion Detection 
Firewalls are usually the first line of defense against attacks, and historically protect 
the perimeter of the network. They can filter out packets based on known malicious IP 
addresses, the type of protocol being accessed or even on the content of the packets. This 
can help cut down on the amount of unnecessary traffic that reaches the Web server and can 
prevent some Denial of Service attacks meant to stop access to the server. A good firewall 
will also act as a router - converting the external IP address that is seen by users on the 
Internet, to a subnet of differing dynamically assigned IP address on the internal network. 
This prevents attacks against a Web server with a fixed IP address by stopping it at the 
router. Network Address Translation (NAT) can deliver external information to the 
appropriate server address on the inside network, though we will forward the data to a load 
balancer to distribute the traffic between two or more servers. Another type of firewall is a 
software firewall that resides on each host on the network and can add another line of defense 
by filtering traffic from any source that is attempting to access that particular server. 
Distributed firewalls are another name for these software solutions, and are arguably the 
future of firewall security since even attacks within the "secured" perimeter can still be 
defused, and attempted acts of sabotage from insiders can be blocked. Vigilance is required 
though, as an effective firewall is one that has been configured correctly and contains all the 
current patches and updates. 
Intrusion detections systems (IDS) are another defense mechanism. They analyze 
network traffic for abnormal patterns, alerting system administrators to possible attacks and 
can even actively attempt to block the offending traffic itself. It can stop attacks as they 
occur, and respond to them once they have begun. 
2.6 Ensuring Availability 
Having all the other protections, such as encryption and firewalls does little if the site 
is not available for the user to browse. After all, the Internet is best as an instrument for 
sharing information. When we consider threats to availability for a site today, one main 
thing comes to mind - Denial of Service attacks. 
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What is a denial of service? Here are couple of real-world examples. Alice doesn't 
like Bob, so she contacts every mail solicitation lists she can think of and has them send their 
junk-mail to Bob. Bob begins to get hundreds of letters a day, filling up his mailbox. The 
real mail gets lost in the swarm of junk-mail letters. Or, in another situation, Alice gets a 
new auto-dialer and sets it up to call to Bob's phone number every 30 seconds. Each time 
Bob picks up the phone to answer the call, he waits for several seconds before realizing there 
is no response and hangs up. Then the auto-dialer repeats the process. During this time, Bob 
cannot answer phone calls from his friends because he is too busy answering the prank calls, 
and after a while becomes frustrated and takes the phone off the hook. 
The computer attacks are not much different. The are many different varieties of 
these attacks, but they usually involve the misuse of standard protocols or connection 
processes with the intent to overload and disable the target W eh servers. A TCP SYN flood, 
for example, is created by sending repeated TCP connection requests with no subsequent 
completion, causing the target system to allocate TCP control blocks until it runs out of 
resources. This is effective because it is difficult to tell if the requests are an attack or if the 
connection to the client is simply slow. UNIX process table DoS attacks entail sending 
repeated open-connection requests to a UNIX server. Subprograms - such as Internet 
Daemon (inetd), Secure Shell Daemon, and Internet Message Access Protocol Daemon 
(IMAP) - are written to automatically answer every connection and carry out requests. But if 
the connection is initiated with no request, most daemons keep the line open, using resources 
from the server process table, which is equipped to handle between 600 and 1500 
simultaneous tasks. Repeated connections can very quickly overload the process table and 
crash the server. The Finger of death involves sending a finger request to a specific 
computer every minute, but never disconnecting. Program failure to terminate the connection 
can quickly overload a UNIX server "process table" and bring the Internet service provider's 
(ISP's) services to a standstill for hours. An attack against the SSL protocol could also slow 
the server to a crawl. Normal HTTP traffic is not connection oriented, since it sends the page 
information out immediately after GET requests, and therefore does not continue to occupy 
server resources. There are some steps in the SSL protocol, however, that require several 
requests and replies to set up the encrypted channel. Since processing SSL is already slow, 
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an attack that utilizes this protocol could slow the server down immensely. SSL accelerators, 
which will be introduced later, can help to alleviate this problem. 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are particularly lethal to servers since 
the traffic comes from many different sources on different networks. This makes it difficult 
to block the attack, as new "zombie" hosts can be enlisted to further carry out the attack. 
Tracking the person at the source is also more difficult since there are multiple sites used as a 
launch pad, sites that are probably unaware they are contributing to the flood of traffic. 
Trinoo is one distributed tool used to launch coordinated UDP flood denial of service attacks 
from many sources. It makes use of higher port numbers to communicate between the 
master, controlled by the intruder, and the daemons which are the violated computers that do 
his bidding (Figure 1 ). Tribe flood network (TFN) is much like trinoo, but can also generate 
TCP SYN flood, ICMP echo request flood, and ICMP directed broadcast (i.e. smurf) denial 
of service attacks. TFN has the capability to generate packets with spoofed source IP 
addresses. It makes use of an intruder-supplied list of IP addresses for the daemons, which 
may use blowfish encryption to conceal the list. TFN may also have remote file copy ( e.g., 
rep) functionality, for use for automated deployment of new TFN daemons and software 









Figure 1: Distributed-Systems Attack 
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Some DDoS assaults, such as "smurf', are simply based off the weaknesses of 
various protocols. "Smurf' and "fraggle" attacks involve sending a large number of Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo (ping) messages to an IP broadcast address, with the 
forged source address of the intended victim. Most network hosts receiving the ping will then 
take the ICMP echo request and issue an echo reply, multiplying the traffic by the number of 
hosts responding. A fraggle is similar to a smurf except that it uses User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) echo messages. On some networks, potentially hundreds of machines could reply to 
each packet. 
Though accessibility issues often conjure up thoughts of halting DoS attacks, 
availability also deals with keeping a system up behind the scenes - keeping out hackers and 
viruses, ensuring quick patches and preventing defacements to websites. Barring physical 
access to machines is the quickest way to insure that insiders or social engineers don't pull 
off a quick caper by pulling the plug, or rebooting the machine in another mode to gain 
administrator privileges. All of these things are needed to maximize the up time of a server 
and keep the system running smoothly. 
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3. PREVENTION 
Of the three security stages - prevention, detection, and response - prevention is the 
one that receives the most attention. After all, good preventative measures is what informs a 
new user that the site can be trusted, that it will go out of its way to ensure the protection of 
the user's personal information against abuse. It is the most difficult to implement, and the 
most necessary. If a site fails to protect its valuable data, trust breaks down. 
Trust is critical to an auction site - users trust that the data contained on the site is 
current, accurate, and available; sellers trust that bidders will pay them for their products; and 
buyers trust that the seller will deliver the exact posted goods in a timely manner. To ensure 
that this trust is maintained, security for an auction site should focus on preventing intrusions 
that might compromise that trust by adhering to the following criteria: 
• Scalability and availability 
• Thwarting hackers to avoid compromising intrusions, modification of data 
and transactions by unknown intruders as well as insiders familiar with the 
system 
• Preventing identity abuse ( a malicious user stealing another's identity to 
commit fraud) 
• Preventing fraud by either the seller (receiving the payment and then not 
delivering the goods) or the buyer (acquiring the items without paying). 
This includes providing an effective means of feedback to rate the 
trustworthiness of users and dispute arbitration to ensure that users are 
treated fairly in the event that a conflict arises 
• Providing a privacy and security policy to educate users as to how their 
data will be used and protected and provide management with a way to 
deal with security issues. 
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3.1 Scalability 
Scalability is a main concern of this project. It is the ability to handle increased 
traffic without substantially changing the basic architecture of the system. Scalability also 
aids in security by providing several machines to distribute an attack across, lessening the 
load on any single server and reducing the likelihood that all server resources will be 
consumed. Having multiple Web servers eliminates the single point of failure for incoming 
traffic and if configured correctly behind a router with NAT support, can conceal the IP 
address of the server to prevent more attacks. Backup servers can take the load if any one 
server is targeted or contains a security breach and needs to be taken offline. Though 
scalability can prevent or reduce attacks, it also allows the system to expand as needed to 
handle increasing user interaction. Valid traffic will mainly be generated from three sources: 
user login and bidding, information requests for product specifications, and database access 
on the internal network. 
3.1.1 Load Balancing 
The traffic arising from users for bidding or browsing of product information may at 
times consume a large percentage of the server capacity, especially as the number of users 
who frequent the site increases. In the prototype system for the proposal, only one bid from 
each potential buyer or seller is allowed, thus maintaining a lower level of traffic for each 
active auction. As the number of users grows, or if the needs of the system grow to 
accommodate other types of auctions and bidding, the demand on the web servers will 
increase. Also, the database containing product specifications and Bill of Materials (BOM) 
for recycled products will certainly continue to grow. One common way of decreasing the 
load on a server is to insert another and split the load between them. It is also wise to 
provide a backup server in case one fails. For this purpose, a device called a load balancer 
can direct the incoming traffic to the appropriate server to offset massive traffic loads or 
direct traffic away from a crashed server. 
There can be a problem with keeping track of user for some load balancers, though. 
Because HTTP does not carry any state information over from one requests to the next, it is 
sometimes important, especially when keeping track of a user after they are logged in, that 
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the browser maps to the same server for each HTTP request until the transaction is complete. 
This ensures that the user is not load balanced in mid-session to a different server and forced 
to log in again. This is not a problem if the user is always authenticated before any major 
financial exchange or bid, but if the system wishes to track a user after authenticating him, 
then this could pose a possible difficulty. Some load balancers allows the system to 
efficiently deliver authenticated transactions by creating sticky connections. 
The most reliable way to maintain sticky connections is to use cookies to identify 
individual client The user can be identified and routed to the correct server by reading the 
cookie at the load balancer, which then attaches a server-specific string in the header of the 
HTTP traffic flow. The Web server application can also write a server-specific string in the 
HTTP header when it responds, identifying the server that handled the request. The load 
balancer can then be configured to maintain this link on the next request from the user. This 
process is transparent to the user, ensuring that he enjoys continuity over the life of the 
transaction. Figure 2 shows the basic network layout with the load balancer. 
Secondary 
Web Server 
Figure 2: Simple network with load balancer 
Products like Cisco's Web network services switch, contains an SSL accelerator 
which caches and reuses each session, offloading from Web servers the most processing-
intensive aspect of SSL - the SSL handshake [CiOO]. It also resolves the SSL timeout issue 
where the Web server will end an SSL session and release the session ID after a defined 
period of inactivity. When the user sends another request, the server thinks it's a new user 
and begins a new SSL session. If the user is filling out a long form, the information already 
entered will be lost and he will have to start over. The W eh switch resolves this issue by 
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detecting the client's reconnecting SSL session ID, and routes the user to the same server as 
before. It does this by learning the new SSL session ID created by the server when the user 
reconnects and routes the user to the same server upon later requests. As with the content-
smart load balancer, the switch improves efficiency and customer satisfaction by creating 
sticky connections for encrypted sessions. The impact of SSL caching on system 
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Figure 3: Performance impact of SSL session key caching (source: Cisco) 
3.1.2 SSL Acceleration 
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Load balancers can speed response time by splitting requests between different 
servers. But not all requests require the same amount of computing resources. Sending 
sensitive information, such as usemame and password, or bidding information, over an 
encrypted channel requires the use of a public-private key system such as SSL, which is 
probably the most commonly used security measure on the web today for ensuring integrity 
and authentication of user data. In fact, most users encountering a web page where they are 
asked to enter their usemame and password, or credit card information, have grown to expect 
that the information will be transmitted securely. However, SSL, like any asymmetric 
encryption, is highly CPU-intensive because of its authentication schemes and 
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encryption/decryption algorithms, and can cause major performance strains on Web servers. 
If SSL traffic begins to consume a large percentage of the CPU time on the servers, it may be 
prudent to use an SSL accelerator which lets Web sites handle all SSL processing in 
optimized hardware and software. Novell's SSLizer uses an additional processor that 
offloads the encryption processing from the Web server to boost performance for secure 
transactions. Typical Web servers can handle 300 to 400 unencrypted HyperText Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) sessions per second, but only five to ten SSL-encrypted sessions [SpOO]. 
SSLizer off-loads just the SSL processing to another processor, so HTTP traffic is not slowed 
down. Novell states that SSLizer can increase the throughput of secure Web traffic by at 
least 10 times. According to [GoOO] optimized hardware and software for SSL acceleration 
can process 10 to 40 times as many SSL sessions as a standard Web server. It can also free 
server resources to process application logic and database lookups much faster, accelerating 
the entire site. Integrating an SSL appliance into the network simply requires a switch or 
load-balancing device to redirect all port 443 (HTTPS) requests to the appliance, which then 
assumes all SSL processing duties, instantly freeing the server from this task. Additional 
SSL appliances can be deployed easily as secure traffic volume grows. Recently, SSL 
acceleration has been added into server-side caches to handle SSL processing and deliver 
data objects at the same time. The Web servers would then only have to retrieve and process 
dynamic data elements. 
Encryption devices may serve to make encryption over the Internet ubiquitous. The 
analyst firm IDC estimates that essentially all Internet traffic will be encrypted by 2005, up 
from less than 10% today [RoO 1]. It is expected that by that time specialized crypto-chips 
will be woven into the Internet's infrastructure, just as graphic and sound cards became part 
of the PC. 
3.1.3 Server Accelerators and Cache Servers 
Another extension that can be added to the network is a server accelerator or caching 
server to feed data such as user records for processing transactions and bids, and active 
auction data information (from those auctions that have started due to sufficient interest). 
The load balancer could be notified as to which auctions are on what servers, then direct the 
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next user to the appropriate server. Or, the caching server could simply cache all auctions 
that have been requested by users and hold them for a short period of time, unless there were 
more requests. Since the user and merchandise information is unlikely to change during the 
lifespan of the auction, the only data that would need to be returned to the database are the 
bids that are entered, as well as some simple key to identify the bidding user and the auction. 
The caching server could also contain the Bill of Materials info, which will quite possibly be 
the largest dispersion of data to users for the site. Since this data is not sensitive, it could 
reside on the caching server indefinitely, but would have to check periodically for updates 
from the main database. It could also generate and supply any dynamic pages that are 
required by the Web server. An additional function that the caching server could perform is 
to check for unauthorized changes to the web server and quickly update the server with the 
correct page. By performing a hash of the Web server files, it could periodically compare the 
stored hash value with a new one and update the files accordingly from a backup. 
Cryptographic checksum and binary integrity checking tools, such as Tripwire [TrOl], can 
periodically compare Web server files with those backed up on the server accelerator, and 
notify administrators of violations. Figure 4 shows the network with the addition of the 




Figure 4: Advanced network configuration, with caching servers and SSL accelerators 
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3.2 Availability 
Receiving a slow response from a server is aggravating enough for users, but if they 
get no response at all, they may choose not to return to the site. They may think that the site 
is not working, not ready, or just doesn't exist. Customers will return to e-commerce sites 
that offer consistently high levels of reliability, and they will avoid sites that deliver slow 
response times, difficult shopping experiences, or failed attempts to make purchases. The 
methods of accelerating Web servers and offloading some of the processor-intensive 
applications shown in the previous section are useful for speeding response-time. They can 
also be helpful in countering part of the strain placed on the network by DoS attacks. 
Disruption of service caused by denial-of-service (DoS) attacks is the "kiss of death" 
for W eh-driven enterprises such as portals and e-commerce sites. The 1999 Computer Crime 
and Security Survey found that system penetration by outsiders increased for three years in a 
row, with 30 percent reporting intrusions. Those reporting their Internet connection as a 
frequent point of attack rose for the third straight year, from 3 7 percent of respondents in 
1996 to 57 percent in 1999 [CisOO]. 
Analysts have noted that hackers are also taking advantage of port/protocol blocking 
techniques in hardware firewalls and routing equipment that block the first fragment of large 
UDP packets but often allow subsequent large packets to pass through to the network. For 
these cases, administrators should inspect their firewall logs for any signs of large inbound 
UDP packets directed at port 80 (HTTP, Web traffic). System logs showing similar 
outbound UDP packets indicate a network has probably already been compromised. Since 
compromised systems are often used to store DDoS tools for use in an attack against other 
sites, the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) [NeOl] has issued a program 
available for download that will automatically check systems for the presence ofDDoS tools. 
Blocking this traffic at the IP-only level (as opposed to protocol-specific level like UDP) may 
improve effectiveness. 
Preventing DoS attacks is critical for most Web sites. It's not too difficult to deal 
with individual DoS attacks when they originate from one computer. When the attack is 
noticed, the IP address of the assailant can be blocked. Until it is noticed, however, the 
network will feel the strain. The bandwidth of the attacker's site may be approximately the 
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same as the victim's, but a distributed load and network approach, and packet filtering can 
reduce the traffic from the attack to a manageable level, allowing legitimate users to still 
access the site. 
The increasing number of attacks, however, are coming from downloadable DDoS 
packages. The first cases ofDDoS attacks came late in 1999, but have increased in 
frequency as more tools are developed by hackers to aid its distribution. Often well-know 
servers with large bandwidth capabilities are targeted to produce the most devastating 
assault. This is not necessary for a DDoS tool to succeed. The rise of always-connected 
PC's over DSL and Cable modems has exasperated the problem, allowing hackers to first 
target these much more vulnerable PCs, then invade and control them as launching pads for a 
major offensive. Usually, PCs are not allocated much upload bandwidth over their 
connections, but combining several hundred or thousand of them to launch an attack would 
be more than enough firepower to bring down a sizeable server. If the attack were traced 
back to these individual machines, most of their owners would be surprised to learn that their 
machines aided in the incident. 
In the wake of the latest DDoS attack on Microsoft, nearly every security vendor has 
been rolling out products claiming to reduce the likelihood and effect of DDOS attacks. 
Cisco's CSS 11000 switch [CiOO], for instance, blocks several approaches that can be used 
for a DoS attack. It will discard suspicious frames if: 
• the length is too short 
• the frame is fragmented, 
• Source IP address = destination IP address (LAND attack - takes up more 
resources as the server tries to respond to itself) 
• Source address is that of the switch 
• Source address is not a unicast (single) address 
• Source IP or destination IP is a loop-back address (used as a closed loop 
on a single machine - should not be allowed to pass out of, or into the 
network) 
• Destination address coming into the local network is not a valid unicast or 
multicast address 
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• An ACK for a three-way handshake is not received within 16 seconds 
(eliminates process-table DoS attacks attempting to make repeated open 
requests to the server) 
• The same source tried an initial SYN more than eight times ( eliminates 
SYN flood, by blocking any further flows from that source with the same 
initial information) 
As any good router, it also hides internal IP addresses using Network Address Translation, 
which can be mapped to one or more external globally unique IP addresses. This protects the 
Web servers from direct attacks. The firewall should also implement egress filter, which 
only allows traffic that originates on internal network addresses to be forwarded to the 
Internet, as well as ingress filtering, which prevents spoofed internal IP addresses from being 
allowed onto the local network from the Internet. 
But inevitably, the weakest link in a security system is its users. If a system 
administrator incorrectly configures a router defending a network, which some believe was a 
big part of Microsoft's problems, or users fail to follow security procedures, the best security 
system in the world is useless. For routers, it is important to verify that it has been 
configured correctly. There are firewall/router verification programs out there that can 
automate this task and ensure the firewall is working properly. 
3.2.1 Some Solutions for Preventing or Countering DDoS Attacks 
It's very difficult, if not impossible to effectively guard against DDoS attacks. One of 
the best and simplest defenses against crippling DoS attacks is to implement as many load-
balancing and high-speed pipes as possible. Load sharing across multiple servers helps 
reduce the impact of classic DDoS attacks. Load balancing and caching distribute rogue 
DDoS packets so one server doesn't take the hit. Some companies have implemented 
anomaly or misuse intrusion detection systems that can detect when an attack occurs. A 
misuse IDS is similar to a virus scanning program in that it knows what the attacks look like 
and actively looks for it. Anomaly detection usually involves doing statistical analysis to 
determine what is normal traffic, and stopping those which are abnormal. These systems, 
however, produce too many false positives, but they are getting better. Moving Target 
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Defense Systems (MTDS) can be used defeat attacks that are directed against a specific IP 
address. They work by moving the server address to another IP address, so that any packets 
directed against the old address are sent to a virtual "black hole". This approach fails though, 
if an attack is directed at the DNS name of the server instead, since valid customers need to 
still be able to access the site and will use the name of the server and not the IP address 
anyway. In a DNS based attack, the assaulting packets would simply be directed to the new 
address, again overwhelming the network. 
3.2.2 DoS Checker 
What is needed is a good way of detecting when an attack occurs and then providing 
a warning to software. One possibility would be to add a DoS checker on the external 
network (outside the perimeter firewall) as shown in Figure 5, whose sole responsibility is to 
send packets to the W eh server at periodic intervals. 
DoS Checker 
Figure 5: DoS checker 
If the Web server doesn't see one of these packets within a specified time, it then has 
reason to believe it is under a DoS attack and can take precautions. Let's say, for example, 
that the checker sends out a packet every 30 seconds. If the Web server doesn't see one of 
the packets signed by the checker within two minutes, it signals a warning that an attack is 
underway. 
The DoS checker would simulate what the user sees during an attack - how slow the 
response time is, as well as if there is any response at all. Of course, the Web server does not 
need to respond to the checker since by simply receiving or not receiving the packets, it can 
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tell if there is an attack or sudden abnormal spike in network traffic by whether the packets 
arrive or if they are much delayed. Based on this information, if the network is too congested 
to allow a packet from the checker onto the network, or if the server's resources have been 
consumed, the W eh server will not be able to process a request from the checker and will 
signal an attack. 
An attack that could possibly defeat this arrangement is if a hacker on the Internet 
attempts to spoof the packets being delivered to the W eh server from the DoS checker. This 
can easily be defeated however by adding in synchronized random numbers between the DoS 
checker and Web server, or by using SSL requests to encrypt simple data that only the two 
machines know. Since the DoS checker can block all incoming packets, it would not be 
susceptible to a network attack. Adding the machine on-site to the outside connection to the 
Internet reduces the chance of physical attack by outsiders. 
3.2.3 Extending the Auction in Case of a DDoS Attack 
In our case, the best solution to counter a DoS attack may be to provide a software 
patch that can make use of a current DoS warning, such as the notification from the DoS 
Checker. One threat of a DoS to an auction site is that one or more of the users who place 
early low bids could trigger an attack ( or perhaps the attack occurs without their knowledge, 
but provides excellent timing for them), barring other users from bidding on an item before 
the auction closes. This would hurt sellers who would receive very low prices for their 
goods. It would hurt other buyers who are in need of the materials they expressed interest in 
to start the auction. And it would perpetuate fraud by the offending buyers, since other users 
may see this as a cost-effective way to obtain goods cheaply. 
A simple way to continue bidding is to give priority to bids that are coming through, 
as well as to access requests for the auction pages that contain the bidding information and 
user login. The Bill of Materials information and general site browsing would have a lower 
priority since these are not time critical, and could be more restricted to allow bidding info to 
be processed. 
One software-based solution involves extending the auction for a specified amount of 
time to a later date. Pushing the reopening of it back a day or two allows adequate notice to 
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the seller and to users who may still wish to bid. This may cause a problem with time 
constrained items. Therefore, the system should first check with the seller to see if he wishes 
to tolerate the delay and move the auction back a couple days, or to agree on the current 
winning bid and accept a possible monetary loss from reduced bidding. If the seller agrees to 
end the bidding, the auction is closed and the materials for auction go to the current high 
bidder. If the seller accepts the delay, all users who had expressed interest in the auction can 
be notified by e-mail that the auction was stopped due to an unexpected attack or an 
"interruption of service" and will be moved back a couple of days. This notice should 
include the starting time and duration of the continued auction, as well as the new link to 
access it. At the agreed upon time, the bidding continues as normal. This policy should be 
posted on the W eh site so that users will have read it and understand how it may affect an 
auction they are involved in. 
3.3 Thwarting Hackers 
As stated before, users are the weakest point of any security system, and this is 
especially true of users with ill intentions. Many computer protocols are built on the 
assumption that communications occur only between trusted computers. Since hackers don't 
obey computer instructions, they can easily slip a few commands into the network that makes 
a machine crash, override access controls, or spill its guts. This section is an attempt to 
analyze the weak points in the security armor that hackers often exploit. 
3.3.1 Security through Obscurity 
The first step of any successful invasion is to obtain information about your enemy. 
A premeditated, serious hack attempt, especially one targeted at acquiring inside information 
such as user information in a database, will require some knowledge of the target network. 
Discovery is the key. 
For this reason, a system should not reveal any more information than necessary to a 
person logging on. If that person is an administrator, they already know the layout of the 
network. Casual users, such as buyers and sellers, have no need to know the specific internal 
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workings of the system, except that which is outlined in the security policy to explain to 
users that their data is indeed secure. 
The first goal is to turn off automatic directory indexing which displays files and 
directories on the server. If active, a user could simply misspell a URL and gain access to all 
files on the server. Also, a person logging on through internal protocols such as SSH or 
telnet (not advised) if it is active, or browsing through the auction pages on the Web site does 
not need to know what type of server they're running on, the operating system, its version, or 
other services. No login banners should contain this information - it is wholly unnecessary 
to insiders and is a great place to start for hackers. Information that is important and 
necessary to users can be displayed after a valid usemame and password have been accepted. 
3.3.2 Eliminate Unneeded Protocols and Programs 
Unprotected protocols and applications are another great discovery point for hackers. 
To reduce the chance of discovery of bugs or open security holes, it is important to disable 
those protocols which are not necessary, reducing the number of applications that could be a 
potential target as well as limiting the amount of information and the tools that an attacker 
could use to launch an attack. Protocols to eliminate especially include: Telnet, FTP, TFTP, 
Echo, Chargen, and Netstat. 
Telnet and FTP can open the door to serious system compromises - passwords are 
sent in plaintext and successful connections allow remote command execution. They are 
notorious for allowing unauthorized users to download, view, and erase files and system info, 
or grab password files to crack with which they can gain access to multiple accounts and help 
to cover their tracks. Both can be replaced with Secure Shell (SSH) and its Secure Copy 
(scp) program for remote login, performing system maintenance and transferring files. SSH 
provides a solid encrypted channel, even at login. 
The echo protocol allows replies to data sent from TCP or UDP connection requests. 
It is advisable to disable this to avoid potential DoS attacks. Chargen service can be 
exploited to pass data to the echo service and back again in an endless loop, causing severe 
system congestion. As a character stream generator, it is unlikely to be needed. Netstat can 
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provide an attacker with active network connections and other information about the sub-
network. If possible this should be removed. 
E-mail should be banned from the main Web server and the other servers that tend to 
the auction site - these should only be allowed on the internal development network, separate 
from the auction network. This eliminates the SMTP and POP protocols and cuts out the 
possibility of receiving ever more popular viruses and trojan horses through e-mail 
attachments. For e-mail notifications between users, users would be allowed to send 
messages to other users, but through a feedback dialog box, and not the standard e-mail 
protocols. The e-mail would not be stored and viewed on the server, but would have the 
internal addresses translated to the correct outside address for the user that is stored in the 
database, so messages could be passed to an internal server that handles the mail, and 
removed immediately from the system. This way, e-mail can be kept confidential and still 
delivered to the appropriate parties. Also, it does not take up storage space on the server and 
doesn't allow any e-mail attachments to be run on the server to introduce backdoors in the 
system security. Storing e-mail messages and allowing e-mail protocols could also introduce 
other security holes such as mail bombing, mail spamming, and DoS attacks. This is 
eliminated by making the user fill out an HTML based form for each message that can only 
be targeted to one user. 
Most current DoS attacks can be eliminated by removing the above protocols from 
the Web server. This can easily be done on both Unix and Windows servers by commenting 
out a few lines in the inetd.conffile (for unix) or removing it from the list of programs 
through the administrator account on the Windows platform. Blocking Ping and ICMP echo 
requests is one of the best ways to prevent range scanners from picking up the servers IP 
address and logging it for later attacks. A successful IP scan of the server by the hacker often 
leads to port scanning soon afterward. [ChOl] contains good examples of how to close down 
unnecessary ports and applications. 
In fact, for the Web server, only SSL and HTTP connections should be allowed on 
the outside network. SSH should be provided only on the internal network to allow 
administrators to optimize or update the system. If users required remote access, they could 
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first log into the local development LAN and connect through the firewall on that side 
(Figure 6). 
3.3.3 Enforce Authentication Measures 
Now that the protocols that are accessible to users through the Internet and through 
the back-end have been decided upon and secured, secure authentication measures over those 
protocols must be enforced. There will be two types of authentication for the two types of 







Figure 6: Secure admin login with SSH 
HTIP 
SSL 
The first is authentication for the Web site auction user. Since all personal 
information including usemame and password are protected by SSL in transit to the server, 
we do not have to worry much about someone intercepting the information en route. The 
greatest concern is encouraging users to choose passwords that cannot be easily guessed. 
This is important to prevent identity theft - another user guessing the person's usemame and 
password and performing bids in their name. It would be hard for the user to later claim that 
she did not place those bids since her usemame and password will have "signed" the 
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transaction. If users are left to choose passwords completely on their own, they will choose 
the weakest, easiest to remember password that will probably involve a person's name, 
phone number, or Social Security number that they know. Many users who have not been 
told why they should choose difficult passwords often come up with common keyboard 
combinations, or simple words, thinking they are being clever in their selection. Educating 
users about password selection is a good idea, but is often not very effective. 
The most effective way to prevent easily guessed passwords is to have the server 
automatically screen for them when a user registers for a new account, or decides later to 
change his password. Programs for login, such as anlpasswd can proactively screen 
passwords as they are entered. This same type of tool should be used to check W eh site 
passwords. It should run a series of checks ensuring that the password 
• is not a part of or similar to the user's name or username 
• is not a dictionary word 
• is not a common keyboard pattern or number such as "Qwerty" or 
"12345" 
• does not consist of all numbers or all letters (to prevent names or phone 
numbers) 
• involves capitalization and lowercase letters. 
Forcing users to choose difficult-to-remember passwords presents another problem -
users forgetting their passwords. Some sites allow the user to request to have their password 
sent to their e-mail address that they entered when they registered. This is a fairly safe 
procedure, assuming that an attacker isn't the one requesting the password and then sniffing 
the connection on the user's end. It might be prudent though to have the user enter their 
username and provide them with a challenge response. This may involve asking them a 
question that they set up when they registered that only they know the answer to. This 
provides at least another security check that the person requesting the password is not a 
hacker in disguise. 
Authenticating internal administrators presents some similar challenges. For these 
users on the back-end of the security system, access to the main servers should be restricted 
to SSH communications. This can also limit the amount of information that inside attackers 
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could obtain by monitoring the internal development LAN. Like before, passwords that are 
easy to guess should not be allowed, and anlpasswd can be used to proactively screen 
passwords as they are entered. The same types of checks should apply, but should be a little 
more rigorous for administrators since they hold the power to modify the system. There 
should only be a small number of people - 3 or 4 at most, that know the root password. 
Require administrators to login under a different user account first, and then su, or switch to 
the root account after connected. This way the root account can be made inaccessible 
directly from the network and requires an additional level of knowledge before granting full 
access. Passwords for all accounts should be checked periodically by running "crack" on 
them to see if they can be broken in a short amount of time. On the server, the passwords are 
often stored in a world-readable file in an easily accessible location. Implement password 
shadowing to protect against password cracking by successful intruders. Password aging is 
also a possibility, forcing the user to change his password every several months. Those 
accounts that are inactive for more than three months should be disabled to limit attacks on 
old accounts, or accounts that are rarely used. Require users who need access to a disabled 
or new account to physically identify themselves before granting any requests regarding 
those accounts, or access to passwords. Notify users of accounts that show repeated login 
failures. Don't enable lockdown of accounts after repeated login attempts as this could cause 
a DoS on those accounts. Any accesses to their account should be displayed to alert them if 
anyone else is using their account at the same time. 
Two factor authentication is a powerful tool to prevent unauthorized users from 
gaining access to inside accounts in the first place. These combine something a user knows, 
with something the user has. An excellent example is the RSA SecurID, a small device 
assigned to users for access to the server. [RSAOl] It uses and displays a random number 
which is kept in confidence with the server, and changes every minute. Users must enter this 
random number from their SecurID token, together with a four-digit PIN number which only 
they know. Even if someone is able to determine the user's PIN number, they would also 
have to acquire the token owned by the user. This makes a remote attack very difficult since 
attackers would not have access to the token hardware. If a token is ever lost or stolen, the 
user would have to physically show some ID to one of the token distributors and wait for his 
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account to be reconfigured to accept the new token. This would be a good opportunity to 
scan the user's account for Trojans or unauthorized activity, before assigning the new token. 
3.3.4 Monitor Network for Vulnerabilities 
Developing stronger authentication policies to verify the identity of users and alerting 
users of unauthorized accesses to their accounts is one way of preventing and monitoring 
intrusions. Another is to routinely inspect the network for vulnerabilities before an intrusion 
occurs. 
Automated vulnerability scanners probe the system and network for known 
weaknesses that could be exploited by hackers. These can include open ports that could be 
blocked, activity on ports that indicates a Trojan horse or unauthorized activity, applications 
that are prone to attack, or outdated operating system and program patches. Though the 
scanners cannot be expected to cover every exploit in the book, they are a good tool 
administrators can use to patch the most obvious ones. The best scanner is one that provides 
continuous updates to its scanning engine, much like most virus scanners today, and provides 
a helpful list of solutions to patch the most common security holes. In [FS01], several 
vulnerability scanners were tested to find security holes on the network. Most of these 
scanners perform passive scans against the hosts on the network, probing for holes, but not 
actually attempting to exploit them. And for good reason - an active and invasive scan could 
bring the server down, or cause unexpected behavior in applications. There are some times 
when you would want to allow active scans, but these should be run against an additional 
machine that can be sacrificed if necessary. Many companies make use of a Quality 
Assurance (QA) server (Figure 7) in which both the hardware and the software are identical 
to the main Web servers. This allows them to test how pages will look and perform on the 
actual machine, as well as noting the effects of changes to the site before they are posted to 
the Web servers. This is also a good machine to experiment on to run active, invasive scans 











Figure 7: Quality Assurance server 
HTTP 
SSL 
After performing automated scans of the network, experienced "tiger teams" can be 
brought in occasionally to provide a human approach to probing the network to find holes 
that the vulnerability scanners may have missed. They work under the assumption that no 
Web site is truly secure - every site has some security hole that can be exploited, and since 
every site has a different configuration, sometime it takes a human behind the controls to find 
the hole that automated scanners would not even look for. Exploiting scripts for changing 
product prices on a Web site, for instance, is one thing that scanners would miss, but hackers 
could take advantage of to modify the $1,000 tag on an item to $1. Security experts like Eran 
Reshef, whose company sells products to stop application hacking (where attackers bypass a 
site's firewall to assault scripts, applets, and code), is hired by businesses to probe their sites 
for weaknesses. Reshef's company, Perfecto, has audited 50 brand-name sites and found 
security breaches in all of them. He was able to access any file, even sensitive customer 
information, on eight of them and gained full administrative control on two. The longest 
time it took him to crack a site was ten hours, the shortest was ten minutes [TyOO]. This 
shows that if a site is popular enough, it will be cracked. 
A new vulnerability that has increased over the last few years is from wireless access 
to internal networks. This allows hackers to gain access without even having a tool 
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physically connected to the network. Many corporate and home users mistakenly believe 
that their network name serves as some kind of password, or don't consider that their 
wireless network's electronic "cloud" extends beyond the building walls. If they setup their 
wireless access points behind the firewall, they are exposing their networks to inside attacks 
by anyone with a laptop. Even if the access points are outside a firewall, intruders can still 
use the network to stage attacks or gain free bandwidth. Chris Wysopal, director of research 
and development at @Stake, declares "Sometimes you can just drive into the parking lot [ of 
hi-tech corporations], turn on your laptop and be on their network. We've seen it in a lot of 
brand name companies that you would recognize .... It's kind of like war dialing: you never 
know what you're going to get." [PoOl] War dialing, a term from the movie WarGames, is a 
technique in which hackers program their systems to call hundreds of phone numbers 
searching for poorly protected computer dial-ups. Hackers may already be cruising around 
cities in cars and on bikes, with their laptops listening for wireless network beacons. For 
$150 a consumer wireless card will detect the beacons and put you on the net. Peter Shipley, 
a computer security researcher and consultant, plans to "war drive" the streets of California 
cities, searching for open wireless networks and noting their GPS coordinates. When he's 
done, he'll have a database that maps the geographic location of possibly thousands of these 
exposed networks. 
3.3.5 Prevent Viruses and Trojans 
Just as open wireless access points can expose an internal network to attacks, Trojan 
horses and viruses can do the same thing by opening a security hole on an inside host. By 
eliminating many of the protocols mentioned earlier, the chances that a Trojan can be 
installed on a server within the network is small, thus reducing the threat of the site being the 
target of or the aggressor in DoS attacks. 
Currently, the most common source of viruses and Trojans is though e-mail 
attachments. By limiting e-mail to computers that are not on the same network as the Web 
server, this threat can also be minimized. All machines involved in the operation of the site, 
though, should contain a virus scanner to check for malicious files that may have somehow 
made their way to the servers. These scanners could be run occasionally by administrators, 
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but a better policy may be to configure them to run automatically during lmown slow hours 
to avoid stressing the server at peak times. Another possibility is to place the scanner on a 
different computer, such as the server accelerator, and have it run the scan over the network. 
This, however, opens up a trusted port that could allow other uninvited traffic to enter. The 
workstations that administrators use on the internal development LAN should definitely 
contain virus scanners to monitor for e-mail and boot-sector viruses, since these problematic 
programs usually appear where human interaction with computers is the greatest. Some of 
them could spread to the servers once the administrator connects to perform maintenance, 
creating havoc for Web site managers, as well as auction users. Every month, three to seven 
businesses contact McAfee's Anti-Virus Emergency Response Team (A VERT), reporting a 
new virus that sometimes stalls operations for hundreds or even thousands of users for days. 
The Carlsbad, Calif.-based research company Computer Economics reports that in 2000, 
computer viruses caused $17 .1 billion in damage worldwide [ ScO 1]. By comparison, virus 
scanners can be a cheap preventative measure. 
3.3.6 Avoid Web Site Defacement 
Web site defacement and disconnected links can also cost a company money in terms 
of lost sales and embarrassment. An auction site transfers some of that loss to users who 
cannot access the site to bid or receive bids. Automated tools are already available on the 
Web for hackers to target a site and commandeer the Web pages. 
An easy way to prevent attacks is to stay current on the latest OS and software 
patches, and provide basic defense. TruSecure's director of risk assessment, Paul Robertson, 
says that the most common hacker exploit, called RDS, which lets hackers deface Web 
pages, was actually fixed three years ago. But sites that have no security precautions continue 
to fall prey to RDS. "People just aren't protecting themselves," he says, "because security's 
not on their radar." [RuO 1] 
One interesting way to preserve website files from being erased or modified by 
intruders is to put all data for the site onto CD-ROM or to put it on some other write-
protected media. This is a sure-fire way to protect from a Web page hack, as an attacker 
cannot remotely overwrite files on the CD-ROM. Restoring non-write-protected Web pages 
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after modification is another option. Earlier, we looked at how system files could be restored 
by checking the hash or checksum of the files, comparing them with a protected backup such 
as those provided by server accelerators, and replacing any files that had been modified. 
This should be an automated task that is performed frequently. If an attack changes a page 
for instance, the server should notice within five minutes and respond by uploading the 
correct version from the protected list of files. Additionally, write-protected media could be 
used as a backup for the files on the hard drive. If files were changed by an unauthorized 
user, or if an administrator was in the process of uploading new files for the Web server, the 
file checker could automatically check and see that the files were corrupt, or were being 
modified and could divert web page requests to write-protected media. Since all dynamic 
data is essentially read from the database anyway, the server could still process requests 
without a valid user ever knowing that an attack has occurred. 
The Web server itself should never run from the root account. This exposes the rest 
of the file system if a security breach occurs. Instead, a new user account, Webserver for 
instance, should be setup to contain the document files for the site and separate the files from 
the rest of the system [RG98]. Configuring privileges for this account can give the Web 
server read access to all the files it needs, without granting write access to itself or its own 
configuration files. Thus, a compromised Web server won't lead to further penetration of the 
host. 
3.3.7 Preventing Damage by Insiders 
Not all attacks come from unknown hackers. Studies show that 60% of computer 
abuse is caused by insiders, and 85% of computer break-ins occur internally. Insiders still 
remain as the most serious threat to intellectual property. (HC98]. 
Strong authentication is a first step, but some form of access control should also be 
used to ensure that only a few users are given direct access to the Web server and database. 
Others who work with the Web site and database design and could run their applications on 
the development workstations on the local LAN first and later post them to the QA server for 
testing. Only after successful tests should trusted administrators then upload the files to the 
main Web servers. 
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Software firewalls on each machine can be used to check the validity of packets 
entering the machine, as well as blocking access from all machines that are not specifically 
meant to communicate with the servers. They can also be used to verify the protocols used, 
configure what users and access is allowed, and to log all activities arriving at or leaving 
from the machine. 
Though hardware and software firewalls block remote access to servers, all physical 
access to the servers should be blocked as well. Controlling physical access to the W eh 
server and its programs and data is an important, but often overlooked aspect of Web site 
security. Insiders, or social engineering intruders, could walk off with or sabotage server 
hardware, or take over as administrator by restarting the machine in single user mode. This 
also protects against accidental outages and damage such tripping over a power cord, 
snagging and pulling out network connections, or spilling liquids on the machines. In the 
end, the critical data is only as secure as the lock on the door to the machine room. 
Finally, if a user no longer needs access to a particular service, that access should be 
withdrawn in a timely manner. Thus, if someone switches to various assignments on the 
network, or is no longer working on the site, he should not be allowed to modify aspects of 
the system that he is no longer authorized to access. 
3.3.8 Inverted Security 
A good general security principle to follow is that of "inverted security" [Fo99]. This 
is the belief that security measures should be distributed rather than clustered and isolated, 
and that data should not be encrypted or secured unnecessarily. Data integrity should be 
preserved, but data that is not sensitive should not be encrypted, and should be freely shared 
with users. More information available means more compelling Web sites and higher value 
networks. The level of security and encryption should fit the level of privacy required 
(Figure 8). This principle also hinges on the notion that the most secure system is one that is 
simple to manage and is easily understood. As the number of security measures, the 
sophistication of the system, and the amount of working knowledge necessary to maintain a 
site increases, the security effectiveness decreases (Figure 9). 
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Figure 8: Levels of security based on risk (source: @Stake) 
The main reasons for this is security personnel become oveiwhelmed by the vast 
number of treasures needed to secure a site and may cut comers to ensure efficiency, or the 
users and system-maintenance personnel find the security policies become a burden to them, 
and thus try to circumvent them. By placing strict requirements on password selection, or 
requiring a separate password for each machine, users often resort to writing lengthy and 
difficult-to-remember passwords on pieces of paper which they post near their computers. 
ID badges and smart-cards can easily be lost and need to be replaced. 
Effectiveness 
Time 
Figure 9: Complexity vs. effectiveness 
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Since some security requirements are lifted for local users, inverted security 
emphasizes accountability, through regular security training, logging all activities, and 
enforcing policies quickly - users should be e-mailed about any violations of the security 
policy to reiterate what the policies are and what will be done about them. 
There are some minimal security measures which need to taken, though they may be 
less efficient, but the best overall procedure is that security should be as transparent to the 
user as possible, reducing the possibility that they might unwittingly or maliciously attempt 
to skirt it. If the user is already validated on one machine or application, he should be able to 
move from application to application without having to retype his usemame and password 
repeatedly. Digital Certificates can be used to hide the security from the user, but are often 
difficult to implement across an entire network. Still, the policy should make security as 
easy as possible for users to follow, lest they attempt to subvert it to save time. Making more 
unencrypted information available means less access control, less security to defend large 
amounts of data, and takes away some of the temptation of forbidden information. The 
database is one area where information could be shared more freely. 
3.3.9 Securing the Database 
The database is the single most lucrative focus for malevolent hackers, partly because 
of the allure of its hidden information. It is there that the information from hundreds to 
thousands of users is stored in one location for the server, and possibly the clever hacker, to 
access. Though all of the data is in need of protection from unauthorized modification, not 
all is in need of encryption. Some information is meant to be shared openly with users while 
some is not, permitting varying levels of encryption, from none to very secure. This allows 
us to divide the auction database information into three parts. First, the material and 
disassembly information will occupy the largest percentage of the data stored on the server. 
Since this is information that should be made easily available to everyone and contains no 
sensitive data, it can reside unencrypted on the database server. The main concern with this 
data is that it does not succumb to unauthorized modification. Preventing direct outside 
access to the database and validating new information added by users or checking the 
accuracy of requests to modify the data can ensure this. Secondly, auction information is 
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slightly more sensitive since this contains information about who the sellers and buyers are, 
how many auctions they are involved in, and the total value of their materials for sale. 
However, the other auction information, such as quantity of materials as well as asking price 
and description is available to everyone who browses the web site anyway, and does not need 
to be encrypted. The buyer and seller information should be stripped from the general 
auction records. This could be accomplished by adding a different unique ID number for 
each auction that a user is involved in. This number will be linked internally back to the 
private information stored in the encrypted user information section of the database that is 
only available to the web server itself and cannot be accessed by users. Since the same user 
would have different numbers to identify him to the server for different auctions, no one 
could deduce how many different auctions that user is involved in, nor identify who he is in 
later auctions. Even if someone does business with him and thus gains knowledge of the 
identity of the user at the close of a previous auction, knowing the previous number would 
not be beneficial in identifying the user in a later auction. There are times when the buyer 
would like to ask the seller a question. In this case the identity of the seller could be 
displayed as "user #001341515", where the ID number of the user is displayed as an internal 
hyperlink. When a buyer clicks on this link, they could brought to another page to compose 
and send their message. The server would convert the ID number to the seller's actual e-mail 
address, add the corresponding ID number for the buyer to allow the seller to respond, 
include any additional information about the auction and items in question, transfer the 
message to an e-mail server, and send the message to the seller. No confidential user 
information or e-mail address is ever revealed. Many auction sites have switched to an on-
site e-mail response system to block direct e-mail addresses and improve interaction between 
users and customer service. Between these factors, we maintain the most open sharing of 
data while at the same time protecting user privacy and speeding data processing by avoiding 
unnecessary encryption overhead. 
A voiding unnecessary encryption means the records in the database will be accessed 
more quickly. Symmetric key encryption speeds the access and storage of encrypted data. 
However, this presents the problem of storing the key needed to unlock the data, a key which 
if discovered by an intruder could be devastating since it could reveal all of the user 
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information stored in the database at once. One clever method of protecting the key is to use 
a separate hardware device whose main purpose is to store the key and prevent it from being 
read by unauthorized users. If the Web server required an individual record from the 
database, it would sent over a short, high-speed link to this device where it would be 
decrypted and returned to the server. A drawback of this is that the information requested 
must first be sent over a direct connection to the device to be decoded and then sent back to 
the requesting server, adding one more device and delay to the process. This takes slightly 
more time, but since the volume and frequency of encrypted user data is small, this process 
would occur very quickly. If the device also creates and stores the secret key, it could 
generate a random stream of bits, as opposed to weak password-based encryption which 
results when users are allowed to control the applied encryption - a problem in Windows NT. 
Devices similar to this include crypto tokens, such as the iKey 2000 from Rainbow 
Technologies, which can generate and store public key pairs and digital certificates and 
perform digital signatures for asymmetric encryption, all in hardware. The private keys are 
never exposed to attack by hackers, viruses, or even users trying to subvert security policies. 
[RTOl] 
3.3.10 Choosing the Right OS and Web platform 
Operating systems are the backbone on which all other programs (including 
cryptographic algorithms) run, yet because of their complexity and often proprietary code, it 
is difficult to settle on which one is the best from a security standpoint. 
There are two main sides to the issue: those who believe that security is best 
provided through obscurity on proprietary systems (Windows NT), or those who think that 
open-source software produces well-written, secure code because it is open for public 
scrutiny and revisions. Both points are valid, but each has it's problems. 
Proprietary code provides its defense, because it is hidden from users, and not many 
people know how it works. However, attacks have and will occur against OS giants like 
Microsoft, and the source has the potential (if it hasn't already) to be distributed over the 
internet by hackers, thereby opening its code for analysis by anyone who wants to view it. It 
will only be so long. Since the code has been forbidden to the public for so long, this makes 
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a tempting target, and many more people will want to look through it - security professionals 
and hackers alike. 
On the other side of the coin, open-source OSs, like Linux, are strong because they 
can undergo testing and revision by everyone. However, the number of people who test and 
modify sections of code is actual quite small - no where near the millions that some people 
like to think. Also, since the code is public, any programming mistakes are sure to be found 
and exploited. Open-source has two things going for it - it's free, and its security does not 
rely on maintaining secrecy. It has nothing to lose. When source code from proprietary 
systems is revealed, it will face public criticism that it never had to deal with before. 
But the objective in this section is not to prove which is the best, but to provide some 
statistics on which operating systems and W eh platforms have been chosen by companies on 
the Internet. According to the reports by IDC, for instance, Linux server shipments increased 
166% to 72,422 units in fourth-quarter 1999 from fourth-quarter 1998, representing the 
fastest growing operating system in the server market [IDCOO]. Generally, open-source 
systems such as Linux run the Apache W eh server, and Microsoft Windows NT and 2000 
servers run Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS). Table 2 shows the percentage of 
market share for each type of Web server, based on data from a Netcraft survey of 
28,669,939 sites [NetOl]. As the increased use of Linux implies, Apache Web server has 
only strengthened its position as the server of choice. While Microsoft's percentage has 
leveled out, Apache has a seen a steady rise in market share over the past several years 
(Figure 10). IDC's senior research analyst, Hoang Nguyen, states that end users will "select 
Linux servers not just because of price, but because of reliability, availability, and 
performance as well." 
Another, perhaps more important factor in choosing which platform to operate, is 
choosing the one that is most comfortable to the administrators, or choosing administrators 
that are most comfortable with the system. If the system managers are not knowledgeable 
with a system, they are more likely to make mistakes and incorrectly configure the servers. 
This can be a serious problem when break-ins occur, or even in the day-to-day operations of 
the network. 
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Table 2: Sites worldwide by server type 
SB1Var I as of 5(1,00 P11roent 
Apache 9.095~1 40 60.4% 
Microsoft-I IS 3,168.831 21.1% 
Nets cape-Erierpri:se 1,083.1 51 7.2% 
Zws 301,073 2.0% 
Rapldtite 277. '147 1.8% 
thttpd 204,1 87 1.4% 
WebSitePro 108,327 0.7% 
WebLogic: 90,809 0 .6% 
Stronghold 89.682 _ 0.6% 
W~bSTAR 81 ~901 0.5% 
Other 541.421 S.6% 
Total 15.,039.479 100.0% 
Figure 10: Market share for Web servers August 1995 - April 2001 (source: Netcraft) 
3.4 Preventing Auction Fraud 
So far, most of the security preventions have focused on preventing unauthorized 
intrusions and attacks aimed at bringing down a system or changing crucial data. Fraud is 
another security matter, possibly the most important concern for user-interactions on auction 
sites. Users will only use a site if they have a high degree of trust in the system. 
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3.4.1 Common Problems and Approaches to Auction Fraud 
Fraud is the most common problem among auction sites, frustrating buyers and 
sellers both. The three main problems dealing with fraud that an auction site should help to 
alleviate are: 
• The seller doesn't deliver the goods after receiving payment 
• The seller posts incorrect information about items for sale to deceive 
buyers 
• The buyer receives items without paying 
While it is very difficult to prevent such violations since the auctions inherently rely 
on the trust of each individual user, it is feasible and prudent to provide a means of feedback. 
Feedback from buyers and sellers is an important security aspect that several auction sites 
like Ebay have taken into account. It allows users to note the trustworthiness of others, and 
help them decide if that auction is a good one to bid on, based on the trust rating of the seller, 
or allow the seller to determine if he wishes to sell to a questionable user. After an auction is 
complete, the seller and buyer can both rate each other on how well their deal had gone. 
Some important things to consider when bidding is whether the user has negative feedback 
from people he has done business with, how many positive bids he has closed, and how long 
since his usemame was created (to show possible usemame switching by unscrupulous 
sellers). Even though a user's ID number can change with each auction (to maintain 
anonymity), the user rating will follow his account. However, there are some users who, 
either after fraud or several negative feedback ratings, will create a new usemame to avoid 
the penalties and holds on their account. It is difficult to entirely eliminate those users since 
their new usemame will be a clean slate and look like any other new member. But there are 
ways of warning potential customers, such as notifying them that the user has recently setup 
a new account, or comparing small changes in the user's address or name that might allow 
him to open a new account, and flagging this as a possible violation. A new user with no 
rating, however, is often preferred to an experienced user with multiple negative feedback 
ratings, and may provide some incentive for a thief to jump usemames unless some other 
measure is taken to make the move undesirable. 
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Other problems that occur at many auction sites are shill bidding and bid shielding. 
Shill bidding is when sellers use secondary user IDs or other members to artificially raise the 
price of an item. To help prevent this on Ebay, family members and those living together are 
not permitted to bid on each other's items [EbOl]. Filtering out bids by friends would be 
much more difficult. Bid shielding involves buyers or their acquaintances using multiple 
user IDs to temporarily raise the price of an item to extremely high levels to discourage 
others from entering, then withdrawing their bids near the end of the auction and allowing a 
user with a low bid to win. This scenario can be prevented or diminished by not allowing 
users to change their bid prices, or not allowing it unless through arbitration after the auction 
has closed. 
Though the sealed-bid auction proposed by the project may take care of these 
problems by allowing the users to enter only one highest-bid amount and sealing the bids so 
that others can't see the amounts, in the future additional auction procedures may include 
other forms of bidding, and require ways of dealing with these problems. The system, for 
example, could note who is involved in each auction. If the same people continue to 
withdraw bids, or artificially drive the bids way above the normal market price of the item 
( which can be estimated through information obtained by the Product Design Advisory 
subsystem), then a warning would be sent to all the involved users stating that the next such 
occurrence will result in a negative feedback penalty. The users would be allowed to respond 
to the allegations, and if they did not, the occurrence would be marked in their user profile. 
One way to ease the anxiety of bidding is for the auction system to provide insurance 
on high-priced bids for a small fee. The fee could be automatically calculated based on the 
price of the item to be bid on, as well as the trustworthiness of the seller - yet another reason 
to keep the seller honest, as buyers will be less willing to pay the higher insurance costs 
because of his poor feedback. Some sites already provide some insurance on high-priced 
items, but most require a minimum limit and are not based on the seller's negative feedback 
history. 
On the other hand, a way for the seller to improve the odds that his sale will proceed 
without a hitch is to limit the sale to only those buyers with a specified feedback rating. For 
instance, he could state that only those bidders with a negative feedback rating of two or less 
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would be allowed to bid on the items he has up for auction. The bidding algorithm could 
then automatically reject any suspicious bidders who do not meet those qualifications. 
Not only is it important to rate the user on delivery of the money or goods, but it's 
also important to allow users to leave short messages to the people they do business with to 
explain why they had a positive or negative experience. This way, sellers can see if the 
complaints from buyers were about the quality of their products, the timeliness of delivery, or 
if the products delivered matched the product description on the website. Honest mistakes 
sometimes happen and inexperienced buyers may resort to leaving a negative feedback 
before notifying the seller of potential problems or concerns they are having. Sellers can 
rank buyers on the payments they did or did not receive, or if the payment was exceptionally 
late. If a user feels they received a negative response in error, they can counter with a 
description of how the problem was corrected, and can take it a step further to fight the 
negative rating through arbitration, if necessary. Since individual users cannot delete 
feedback about themselves from other users, they must consult a trusted third party to handle 
any rating disputes to clear a negative evaluation from their record. A good auction site 
should provide an "investigations and corrections" group, accessible by a hyperlink on the 
auction site where users can go to seek help in settling disputes they have with another user. 
In some cases where feedback tampering or serious fraud is evident, a punishment may 
constitute suspension or cancellation of the offender's account, based on his feedback 
history. To help curb feedback tampering, comments should only be allowed once per 
closing of a bid, identified by the unique bid number - so the winner and the seller can 
critique each other just once per transaction. 
3.4.2 Automatic Pricing and Rating System 
Several auction sites already have a manual feedback system that users can view to 
see if they wish to do business with a user. An automatic pricing and rating system, handled 
by the auction system, may help those users who are new to the system, or those who 
neglected to look through the user's rating before making or allowing a bid. It can also allow 
users to set automatic restrictions on who they will sell to or buy from based on their rating. 
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There are several ways to accomplish this. A user could specify that anyone with 
more than one negative feedback, for instance, would not be allowed to trade with him. 
However, one negative feedback means nothing if the user has had 1000 transactions, and 
only one has been bad. This would actually be a good sign that the user is trustworthy, if 
only .1 % of his transactions were negative. But a user with a total of only 2 transactions has 
definitely not proven that he is trustworthy. 
Basing trust on percentages is also another method, but has the opposite effect. If a 
user with 1000 transactions has a %50 negative response rate, there is almost certainly a 
50/50 chance that the next user will have a negative experience with him. If a user has only 
two transactions so far, one negative feedback may be a fluke, or the result of extenuating 
circumstances, and may not accurately reflect the trustworthiness of the user. 
A better way would be to combine these two into a more effective display of the 
user's credibility. An example of this is a feedback structure derived from Ebay's feedback 
system, shown in Table 3. Note that the table only keeps track of responses up to the last six 
months. This allows a user's past transgressions to fade over time and be replaced with their 
most current feedback responses. However, this still uses a manual feedback scheme based 
on forcing users to check the ratings of every person they wish to do business with. 
Table 3: Manual feedback system with number and percentage of responses 
Summary of Most Recent Comments 
Past week Past month Past 6 mo. 
Positive 
4 13 36 
(100%) (100%) (90%) 
Neutral 
0 0 0 
(0%) (0%) (0%) 
Negative 
0 0 4 
(0%) (0%) (10%) 
Total 4 13 40 
Bid Retractions 0 0 0 
In an automatic system, positive feedback from users should elevate trust, while 
negative feedback should lower the trust rating. Thus, there should be several levels of trust 
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with the lowest being the rank "untrustworthy", followed by the level for a new user. Each 
successive level obtained signifies a more reliable user. The top level is reserved for those 
long-time users with a virtually unblemished record. 
A price or credit rating should also be added into this system. This is a limit 
established by the system to prevent a new user or a dishonest merchant from selling high-
priced goods when their credibility has not yet been established, or if the chance of a 
negative transaction is likely. The starting two levels -that of the user with several negative 
responses, followed by that of the new user - should have the same price rating to deter users 
with poor feedback from starting a new account under a different name. Users starting at the 
lowest levels can advance through the ranks by completing several positive transactions. 
After, say, 10 consecutive positive transactions at the user's current bidding level, the user 
advances to the next highest level. Each level determines the maximum amount that any user 
can sell or bid for - the sum of all of their activities. 
Consider, for instance, a credit rating system as illustrated in Table 4. Here, a new 
user starts at level 1, at which point all of his bids must be under $100 - if he has three bids, 
the total of the three bids must be less than or equal to $100. For him to progress to level 10, 
at 10 positive transactions per level, he must make 90 consecutive positive transactions 
without a single negative feedback. This number could be even higher, as he must complete 
10 positive transactions within his current level. For example, a user at level 9 could not 
advance to level 10 by receiving ten positive feedback ratings on items that are only $1000 
(level 4). He must complete ten at his current credit level before being promoted to the next 
level. These transactions at the current level do not have to be consecutive - they can be 
interspersed with lower level transactions - but they must take place without a single bad 
user feedback. 
If a negative response is received from one of the users, a penalty results. This 
penalty could consist of several consequences such as the user's current level record being 
cleared, forcing him start over at that level; dropping him back one level, or suspending his 
account. The severity of the offense determines which course of action should be followed. 
If negative feedback results from non-payment, lateness of payment, or delivery, or delivery 
of damaged or incorrect goods, this may constitute clearing the user's current level record. 
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Two or more occurrences should knock the user back one level. If the number of negative 
responses exceeds a certain level, or the user commits a more severe offense, such as 
tampering with the site to achieve a high bid or inflated feedback, providing false 
information, or using the site to exploit, threaten, or harm users, suspension of his account 
may be prudent. Ebay, for instance, will suspend users' accounts for repeated or serious 
violations. Those who fail to abide by the restrictions set on their accounts after such 
violations may face criminal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's Office. The number of 
violations needed to trigger this response should be established and posted on the site. 
Table 4: Credit range for each user level 
Levels Credit Range 
Level O (poor feedback) <=$100 
Level 1 (new user) <=$100 
Level 2 $100 - $500 
Level 3 $500 - $1,000 
Level4 $1,000 - $5,000 
Level 5 $5,000 - $10,000 
Level 6 $10,000 - $50,000 
Level 7 $50,000 - $100,000 
Level 8 $100,000 - $500,000 
Level 9 $500,000 - $1,000,000 
Level 10 > $1,000,000 
By setting other parameters, such as the number of levels, the price ranges, and 
number of positive transactions required to obtain the next level, the severity of negative 
feedback on a user's account can be adjusted. For example, increasing the number of levels, 
or decreasing the number of successful consecutive transactions required to be promoted, 
lessens the impact of demotion from negative feedback, while decreasing the number of 
levels and increasing the number of positive transactions required raises the impact of 
demotion. When giving a negative response, users should be presented with options for 
selecting which difficulty they face, so that the problem can be better defined if they neglect 
to specify or leave a vague answer to why they have given a negative response. Users must 
also be able to post complaints to an offender's account, even if the account is suspended 
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temporarily. This allows responses to alert other potential victims after the suspension period 
1s over. 
If a new bidder wants to buy or sell a large quantity outside of their credit limit 
immediately, she could go through a thorough verification process where her credentials and 
credit are checked prior to the auction to ensure that her information is correct. This way, if 
any fraud is perpetrated by her, compensation or prosecution is much more likely. This also 
encourages other users to participate in auctions with the certified user, knowing that fraud is 
less likely to occur if the user's true reputation and credit are at stake. 
3.4.3 Other Ways of Reducing Fraud 
An Escrow service recommended by the auction site, is a good way for users to 
arrange a safe exchange of goods and payment, and provides a necessary security blanket for 
expensive items. Auction sites must take it upon themselves to stem fraud fears and 
encourage users to submit bids by directing them to escrow services such as Trade-Direct, 
Tradenable, or iEscrow. These impartial third-party sites notify the seller when the buyer has 
paid, and holds payment of items until the buyer has had a chance to examine the goods. 
Once the buyer approves, the money is released to the seller. The escrow service can be 
invoked by either the buyer or seller, at no cost to the auction site. Sometimes the escrow 
service will even pay a small referral fee back to the auction site that recommended them. 
Other ways to lessen the impact or possibility of fraud on users include providing an 
electronic payment system, insurance for high-priced, high-demand, or suspect items, 
warnings posted on the site for users to protect themselves, and verifying contact information 
that was supplied by the user. Electronic payment systems, like credit cards can provide 
recourse for users after fraud occurs. Credit card companies, for instance, cover everything 
over $50 when a user refutes a purchase. Cash or money orders on the other hand are 
withdrawn directly from a user's account and are lost once they are sent to the seller. This 
leaves the user feeling duped, and decreases the chances that he will return to the site. 
Providing insurance gives the buyer or seller some guarantee that they will not suffer 
financial losses if an auction falls through. For a small fee, the price of a high-stakes item 
can be covered by insurance, and protect the user from fraud. Free insurance or insurance on 
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high-priced items might be an incentive for users to get certified. Several major sites, 
including eBay and Amazon.com already offer free insurance for mid-priced purchases. 
Insurance covers users after the fact, but a warning posted on the site could persuade users to 
be more cautious before they participate in an auction. The notice should include the 
following points: 
• Read and use the feedback rating system for buyers and sellers. Determine 
what rating is acceptable 
• E-mail users to make sure they are who and where they say they are and to see 
if you're comfortable buying something from them. 
• Take advantage of any security measures auction sites offer - such as escrow 
services or insurance - especially for large purchases. 
• Never respond to e-mail messages offering to sell you products that you bid 
for online and lost. These offers are usually scams. 
• If you believe you've encountered fraud, contact the user first to clear up any 
possible misunderstandings. If this fails, report it to the auction company, the 
Federal Trade Commission (www.ftc.gov), and the local police where the 
seller lives. If it is a business, file a complaint with the Better Business 
Bureau (www.bbb.com). 
To decrease the chances that a user in the higher price ratings will enter false 
information to get away with auction fraud, his personal information can be partially verified 
by sending out authentication measures to addresses based on that information. Even for 
low-level accounts, initial passwords should be sent to users via e-mail to verify that at least 
one part of their contact information is correct. Many sites already do this. For higher level 
users, the auction site could mail out authentication tokens to the address contained in the 
user's personal information record, and send the PIN# by e-mail. This would verify two 
pieces of contact information in the user's online record- e-mail and address - and require 
these new authentication measures before the user can participate in high priced auctions. 
This lowers the chances that a user can falsify his information, commit fraud and get away 
with it. 
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3.5 Security and Privacy Policies 
Before the auction site goes online, the auction managers should establish security 
and privacy policies so that insiders know why the security and privacy procedures are in 
place, and external users know what safeguards and policies protect their sensitive 
information. Some examples and descriptions of security policies can be found in [ScOO], 
[ChOl], [Br99]. A thorough description of privacy policies can be found in [EVOl]. 
3.5.1 Security Policy 
The hardest security to maintain is that which involves people. The easiest is that 
using bits. Educating people on a defensive plan drives the need for a security policy. The 
security policy describes what is to be secured, from whom, in what way, and most 
importantly, why those policies are in place. It is a general guideline for security personnel 
to assess the areas of the network where the most protection is needed. It should focus on 
risk assessment to determine the level of security; security methods, providing a map of 
security resources; authentication to ensure that only verified users are allowed access to 
sensitive information; access control for placing restrictions on what data each user is 
allowed to view or modify; and accountability to track and confront individuals who violate 
the policies. 
Risk assessment is one of the first steps that a security policy should follow. It can 
help determine how many resources should be applied to security by listing the causes and 
probability of financial hazards from being on-line. Since we are focusing on an auction site, 
the main threat is compromise of private information. Examining the histories of other 
companies who have had privacy breaches can give an estimate of the cost and likelihood of 
lawsuits that may arise. Researching and stating local government laws and laws of those 
countries in which the site is likely to do business that cover privacy is also a way of 
identifying the risks in revealing private information. If privacy laws are stringent and well-
established, the risk of exposure is high. Gathering information from other similar 
companies could also hint at the severity and average number of hack attacks per year. 
Again, the price of compromised private data is high, but there are also costs associated with 
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loss of personnel time for analysis, data replacement, network reconfiguring, and response 
following an attack. 
The personnel involved in security is the most important resource. The experience 
and skills of each person as well as how to contact information should be listed so that each 
person knows who to quickly turn to for expertise in solving particular problems. Each 
person should be informed as to what security information can be released to the public. 
Much of the security policy and the implementation of that policy is for inside eyes only -
outsiders do not need to know the network details. Just as an army doesn't broadcast the 
location or strengths of its troops to the enemy, there's no reason to broadcast the network 
topology to everyone who asks. I recently asked 25 auction Web sites for some details about 
their network. Not a single one replied with any useful information outside of the security 
and privacy policies posted on their sites. 
The e-mail addresses of the people maintaining the site security should be protected 
from attackers browsing the site for targets. A void including actual managers' contact names 
and e-mail addresses on the Web pages for feedback from users. Instead, it would be better 
to use generic mail or feedback accounts. This reduces the likelihood of giving away staff 
information which may be targeted for social engineering. However, these accounts may still 
be vulnerable to e-mail harassment including mail bombing and bashing. To address these 
potential downfalls, it would be best to eliminate all direct exchanges and include submission 
forms instead. 
A map of the computers and equipment on the network, as well as access points (dial-
in ports, VPN s, maintenance ports, etc) and software on each of them should be clearly 
defined to aid in vulnerability identification and potential security holes. This can aid in 
quickly identifying which computers are susceptible to various attacks and where security 
should be focused during attacks. 
To prevent most attacks, basic security procedures should be followed. Disabling 
unnecessary protocols and applications is one of the most important, limiting the attacker by 
providing fewer targets. System managers should immediately remove any default 
usernames and passwords that ship with a new system. The accounts that are allowed 
unlimited access to the system should be minimized, to prevent a large number of people 
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from being able to modify crucial parts of the system. For those inside users who are given 
access to maintain and ensure smooth operation of the site, only secured access, such as SSH, 
should be allowed to prevent others on the inside LAN from sniffing connections and 
obtaining unauthorized access. Minimum password length and elimination of easily-guessed 
passwords can prevent other inside attacks on accounts, as can the requirement of two-factor 
authentication, such as SecurID, for personnel working on the system with access to sensitive 
data. Printed and electronic data at the end of its lifecycle must be disposed of properly, to 
eliminate the chance of attackers acquiring the physical printouts or hardware that contained 
the data. 
Tight physical security around the servers is also a must, to protect equipment from 
accidental or intentional abuse. It is important to defend the server location from natural 
dangers as well. For the data on the servers, regular backups, updates and patches to the OS 
and applications, and constant network monitoring and vulnerability scans can decrease the 
chances of unnoticed intrusions resulting in damage to the data. Weekly checks for security 
updates is very important. In one case, several Russian hackers exploited companies after 
finding holes in Microsoft products they were using that had already had patches released 
months before. Since no one at those companies bothered to update the systems, the hackers 
continued to blackmail many of them for their weak security [SaOl]. When responding to an 
attack, a serious intrusion, or blackmail attempt, it is also wise to keep list of which 
companies or agencies to contact. Contact software vendors when new holes are exploited in 
the OS or applications. The companies that produce virus scanners should be notified in the 
event of a new virus or Trojan horse that is not detected by the latest virus definition file 
update. The FBI and Secret Service can be called in for extortion and high financial losses 
incurred by an attacker. The FTC and Internet Fraud Watch deals with fraud complaints and 
web scams. These are covered further in the section on response. 
Audit logs, network monitoring, and restricted access control are the best ways to 
ensure accountability. When an offense is committed, it is very important to respond 
immediately to the threat, to catch the offender and restore the network to a secure state as 
soon as possible. 
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To keep the Web server under control, limit the number of programs that are allowed 
to run on the server. The more applications and server components running, the greater the 
security hole. For instance, don't mix a large amount of java, javascript, CGI scripts, or 
other components on the same server - this is begging for an attack. Try to avoid CGI 
scripts, which are the largest source of Web page hacks, entirely if possible, otherwise those 
that pass info in the browser address bar - these can be modified easily by hackers to grant 
access to other areas of the server or to protected data, or, allow others to see login info if the 
CGI program displays username and password info. Also, CGI scripts should not put prices 
or critical information in the source HTML code of the page to be displayed - this can lead to 
page hacking, where the data can be changed and then posted to the server - the "name your 
own price" attack. Web servers can't control how CGI scripts are run, and thus backdoor 
events may occur that are difficult to prevent. 
3.5.2 Privacy Policy 
The privacy policy is much like the security policy - it explains why certain measures 
are needed and helps answer questions relating to privacy concerns. An auction site will 
have need of two types of privacy documents - one that is used internally by the company, 
and one that is presented to the public and the users of the system. The Web site for the 
accounting software company Intacct, for instance, provides a very thorough online privacy 
policy [IntO 1]. 
The internal policy covers such details as what data needs to be protected and which 
data carries the highest risk of compromise. It also includes how to handle and protect 
company data and strategies that should not be released to competitors or the public. The 
first step is often to categorize the data on the system and determine which is most 
vulnerable, or would cause the most damage if revealed. The primary goal is risk avoidance, 
which helps to avoid embarrassing and damaging public relations incidents. System 
managers should know exactly which data is sensitive, and should be informed on how to 
deal with inquiries about the policy or complaints from users. They should also be informed 
on what to do if they feel that privacy has been violated. Staying on top of privacy concerns 
is very important especially in the wake of new laws that will almost certainly appear. The 
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State Attorneys General, the U.S. Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission are all expected to increase their efforts to enforce 
existing laws on the Internet and push for additional laws and regulations. Of these, the FTC 
is the most active government department on the privacy front. They often handle the cases 
of obvious breaches of privacy. If a site is not following privacy regulations, it could be 
deemed negligent in securing users' information. For this reason, it is important to consult 
legal counsel for advice when planning the policy to ensure that applicable laws are met, 
especially now since privacy laws are still evolving and changing the legal landscape. Some 
companies have even taken out insurance to protect against privacy lawsuits. 
Monitoring the privacy policies and problems of business partners and competitors 
can also present a good view on how new privacy policies will measure up to legal scrutiny 
and the opinion of users. If business partners are to be involved in the exchange of sensitive 
data, they should adhere to the policies of the site as a condition of the business relationship. 
No matter how much effort an organization puts into protecting privacy, a business partner 
can cause as much damage and unwanted legal liability as poor internal privacy management. 
Another concern for internal data privacy is determining how information should be 
handled over time. User data should not reside on the system indefinitely, and often should 
be removed after a certain span of inactivity on the account. This both frees up storage space 
and removes old sensitive user data that is no longer needed. Disposing of the data should be 
monitored closely. Printouts should be shredded to prevent unauthorized reading of user data 
after it has been thrown out, and computer hardware should be thoroughly erased or 
destroyed to prevent the restoration of that data. 
The more visible policy is that which is constructed for the general users of the site. 
Here it is important to state how user data is protected and how users can maintain control of 
their personal information. A June 1999 Georgetown University study examined 361 
commercial Web sites and found that nine out of ten asked for at least one piece of personal 
information, such as name, phone number, or e-mail address. Only two-thirds of those sites 
offered privacy statements, and less than 10% had a "complete" policy - one that states the 
site's data collection practices, an opt-out clause, user access to collected information, 
company contact information, as well as describing how the site secures the data that is 
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gathered [BrOO]. In one user survey about online privacy, 64% ofrespondents said that they 
were most worried about W eh sites providing their personal information to others without 
their consent, while 59% said they fear W eh sites collecting information about them without 
their knowledge. Seventy-one percent said it is crucial that companies ask consumers' 
permission before using their personal information for any purpose other than the one 
originally given. Users have grown to expect some form of privacy policy on sites they visit. 
In 2000, 90% have seen a privacy notice, up from 37% in 1998. Two-thirds (65 percent) say 
that if a site doesn't explain its privacy policy, they'll continue to browse, but won't provide 
any personal information [NCLOO]. Many times users are told to avoid sites that don't post 
clear privacy and security policies or contact information, including a physical street address 
and working phone number. 
To calm users fears, a site's online privacy policy should focus on three categories: 
assuring proper use of data collected through the W eh site, maintaining the privacy of 
individuals who use the site, and protecting the data compiled and used by the site from 
outside intruders. 
All three of these categories are addressed by "safe harbor" requirements, which are 
now enforced by the European Union. Following safe harbor requirements actually makes it 
easier to devise a privacy plan, and covers the legal requirements of many nations that a site 
might do business with. To be in compliance with safe harbor principles a site must: 
• Inform individuals as to why information about them is collected, must 
provide contact information for inquiries and complaints, and reveal which 
third parties the information may be disclosed to 
• Provide this information at the point where a user is required to enter their 
personal data 
• Inform individuals if their information is ever used for other purposes, or 
before disclosing it to another third party 
• Provide a way for the individual to limit the use and disclosure of their 
information and correct it if necessary 
In keeping with this, the site should provide an easily accessible link and clearly 
describe how users can do change information about themselves. Users should be allowed to 
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remove their accounts and personal info from the system if they so desire. If personal data 
flows through other parties, such as business partners providing insurance or escrow services, 
this should be explained to users, providing them a way to withdraw their information. 
As the project grows and becomes more commercialized, or separates into a different 
entity, profits will play an increasing role, and marketing personal and business data becomes 
more valuable. This is often where problems arise - companies sell of personal data to 
marketing firms for additional revenue, and face lawsuits when individuals are selected for 
mass-marketing campaigns by third-parties who bought their information. If the policy states 
that "the information will not be sold or distributed to any third-party" everyone involved in 
the auction site had better note this restriction to avoid lawsuits. A safer approach, taken by 
many banks and financial sites, states that "the information may be shared with affiliates and 
others who offer services that would benefit the user". This leaves a bit of lee-way for legal 
maneuvering, and reduces the chances of a lawsuit over selling of sensitive information. 
Loosening restrictions on a policy is very difficult after users expect certain levels of privacy. 
Tightening the policy later is much easier. 
One of the most common marketing gimmicks is to assume that all users want to 
subscribe to extra third-party options. Sites that do this, however, often frustrate users, and 
are required to leave an opt-out option and descriptions on how to do this. Other companies 
focus on allowing the user to opt-in to extra services. Auction sites may offer some 
incentives, such as free insurance on transactions. 
To reassure users that their information will not be snatched during transit to the site, 
the privacy policy should note the use of SSL for encrypting data between the user's 
computer and the server. Even though eavesdropping is a small risk, customers want to see 
at least a respectable amount of encryption as a sign that their personal data is being 
protected. Digital certificates can assure the user that the site they are browsing is certified 
and has not been spoofed by attackers to deceive them. Studies show that well recognized 
and trusted names such as V erisign, create confidence that the site is making a determined, 
honest attempt to protect personal data [Ch99]. If cookies are used to collect user data or 
track users to help them shop, an explanation should be provided, covering what cookies are, 
what data they are collecting, and as a good measure - how the user can deactivate them in 
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their browser. If this affects their online experience, this should be mentioned to the user. 
Since other security measures are surely in place, such as database encryption, it may be 
helpful to generally acknowledge these measures, or state that the data collected is protected 
against further unauthorized access. 
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4. DETECTION 
No network security system is uncrackable. As systems grow more complex, security 
vulnerabilities increase exponentially. Even if patches are applied, new software versions 
introduce more new code, with new bugs. It is impossible for any software to protect against 
all attacks into the future - there will always be vulnerabilities and there will always be 
attackers. If security were left mainly to prevention, successful attackers would get away 
every time to pursue other targets, and system administrators would not understand what had 
happened or which holes to patch. Detection provides individual accountability, 
reconstruction of events, intrustion detection, and problem identification. This allows us to 
catch and punish criminal hackers, or update security measures to ensure that the attack 
won't happen again. 
Effective detection requires a security team that knows how to discover attacks and 
how to track them. The first step toward detection should be the establishment of an incident 
response team, which is trained in networking forensics and detection skills and knows what 
to do, and who to contact after an intrusion occurs. [CERT99] gives some helpful 
information this process. Since attacks usually don't happen very often, this team should 
have drills periodically to practice how to respond to threats to ensure that reaction time is 
quick to catch the attacker in the act. This team should post information about security 
practices to educate others working on the system. Some information can also be used to 
deter attackers. Access points where users log in should inform them that their activities are 
monitored - when logging in to servers, display a message similar to "by using this system 
you consent to security monitoring. ALL user activity is logged, including host name and IP 
address". Even if the system is not thoroughly monitored, a constant reminder may dissuade 
some potential attackers. 
Thoroughly monitoring the network, however, can mean Intrusion Detection Systems 
and redundant audit logs. Intrusion detection, as noted earlier, should watch for anomalous 
network traffic and known attack signatures. Software modules that monitor system 
performance can watch for sudden server or network loads that may signal a DoS onslaught. 
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These systems can notify the system administrators almost immediately after an attack 
occurs. 
User accountability requires tracking individual activity and logging this activity to a 
secure account where the user cannot modify or delete it. Audit logs provide a means of 
capturing all activity, even down to the keystroke of the attacker after he enters the network. 
Single and commonly placed audit logs are susceptible to "log bashing" - the hacker's means 
of deleting, modifying, or circumventing audit trails to remove all signs of his intrusion. 
Hackers can even use cloaking software to seek out and destroy logs, logger files, time 
stamps and temp files. Stealth and redundant logs can help alleviate this threat. Stealth 
logging generates a hidden log accessible to only a few trusted administrators. 
System managers should always assume that they will suffer a root breach, and 
therefore any files within that account may be modified. Since the owner of this account has 
full access to all resources on the computer, it is a prime target for hackers. If the software 
logging the information calculates checksums for the data, it would be very hard for the 
attacker to modify the log file and then correctly guess the new checksum unless he were 
able to run the program to compute it himself. Cryptographically signing the checksum 
ensures that the attacker can't compute and modify its value without corrupting the 
information. 
Good logs are those that cannot be edited or erased by intruders, and can only be 
viewed and modified by a select few. Better still would be logs that require more than one 
person to make changes. This lessens the chance that attackers can get away with their 
exploits without a trace. Backups and secondary log files are also crucial to prevent clean 
get-aways. To protect against insiders covering their tracks, logging responsibilities should 
be assigned to rrrultiple individuals who don't interact regularly. These responsibilities 
should also be handled by someone without root access, so someone installing or removing 
software does not also control the log files. One way to split the log data among multiple 
individuals is to write the files to two separate non-root accounts simultaneously. This is 
similar to the double-entry bookkeeping that many banks and accounting firms are required 
to follow to prevent single edits or mistakes from going unnoticed, and provides checks and 
balances to those inside the organization so one person cannot remove information from the 
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logs after making malicious changes. Multiple logs should be compared often to check for 
signs of intrusion, modification by system managers, and attempts by hackers to cover their 
tracks. To make this as efficient as possible, it is wise to reduce the info generated as much 
as possible, without sacrificing any necessary info - this reduces the strain on system 
resources. The minimum necessary information should consist of the type of event, any 
information transferred, when it occurred, the user and terminal ID associated with the event, 
as well as the program or command used to initiate the event. Compartmentalizing the data 
in the logs helps system administrators sift through the data. This also simplifies the task of 
preparing the logs for any legal process that might arise, to ensure that the legal discovery 
process doesn't result in security violations. 
Despite keeping separate log files, an attacker could still kill the logging program. He 
would then have to locate and eliminate the log files that were generated since his first few 
moves would be recorded, but this is not an impossible task. The system administrator 
should be notified immediately if the logging program is ever terminated, or if access to the 
log files occurs from an unauthorized user. A way to prevent the attacker from killing all log 
programs and deleting log files after a root breach is to isolate some network logging 
software on a separate machine whose sole purpose is to monitor and record internal network 
traffic. This machine, running no other applications and only accessible from a local 
terminal, would simply sniff traffic on the network. Since it would not send out any 
information on the network, an outside attacker would have no idea that it even exists. With 
its network card in "promiscuous mode", it can log all traffic that passes along its segment of 
the network. Two network links - one between the firewall and server, and one between the 
server and database - would be sufficient to record and isolate exactly what information 
reaches the server and which requests access information from the database. The network 
sniffer is shown in Figure 11. 
No other machines should be running in promiscuous mode. If they are, this is a 
good sign that a packet sniffer is running. There are programs available that can check if an 
interface card is in promiscuous mode. After determining which are susceptible, disable 
promiscuous mode on all network cards, except those devices, like the network sniffer, that 











Figure 11: Network Sniffer 
Other than scanning for network packets, all machines should contain some form of 
virus scanner, especially PCs that are used for opening e-mail. Viruses are one of the highest 
risks to security on machines where e-mail resides. Looking back at Table 1, viral infection 
is the second mo st common crime reported by companies. Though they often result in the 
least amount of monetary damage, viruses can destroy files and Trojan horses can leave 
backdoors for hackers to enter later. Detecting and stopping these infections is very 
important to prevent further damage to servers and possible compromise of sensitive data. A 
good virus scanner has at least these three features: active scanning modules which run in the 
background and scan any files that are accessed or opened; mail watching engine that scans 
attachments to any new e-mail messages (mainly for internal development machines where e-
mail will be used); and live virus definition file updating to retrieve the latest updates daily. 
Scanning files on the Web servers can detect unauthorized changes. The servers or 
server accelerators can frequently scan system files on the Web server for any modifications 
by checking the current files against write-protected back-up copies of the latest system 
update. This can be used to quickly detect and restore any files modified by a W eh page 
hack. 
Besides actively scanning the network and files, there are other ways of alerting 
system managers to an intrusion. Computer burglar alarms, like their home security 
equivalent, alert the owners of someone trespassing on their property. In this case, the 
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system administrator leaves some enticing, though false, account or data open that should not 
be accessed, and then sets up trip-wires that send an alert whenever someone attempts access. 
A false database of personal information is a perfect example of some data that might look 
appealing to hackers. The real database is accessed far too many times and most of the 
accesses will be automatic requests generated by the server. For a phony database, that may 
be in the same folder or in a readily accessible high-level directory with a tantalizing name, 
the data is useless to the insiders and they know not to read it, but if viewed by outsiders, it 
looks like a prime target. If they attempt to access the data, however, it triggers an alarm 
signifying that an unauthorized person has been viewing or accessing the files. The database 
should be large enough and current enough to fool the attacker into believing it is the correct 
database. If possible, it should also be setup so that if the attacker attempts to view or 
download the file, it allows the system managers to track and locate the attacker. This is one 
way to notify system managers of the extent of an intrusion, down to exactly which files have 
been viewed or modified, and if an unencrypted database has been breached. One software 
package, mentioned earlier, that tracks and reports intrusions and modifications to critical 
files is Tripwire [TripO 1]. 
Installing a TCP Wrapper for those protocols which are in use can provide better 
logging and access control. A TCP Wrapper is a simple tool to monitor and control 
incoming network traffic. It was developed by Dr. Wietse Venema in 1991 at Eindhoven 
University of Technology in the Netherlands after a Dutch computer cracker repeatedly 
gained root access to the University's computers and destroyed data. This program listens to 
the network ports and runs the appropriate server when a connection is made. It filters 
incoming requests and selectively allows or denies access to other programs through listings 
in two configuration files /etc/hosts.allow and /etc/hosts.deny. When a request is made, the 
wrapper first searches the hosts.allow file to see if the host and protocol are allowed. If no 
match is found, it searches the hosts.deny file to see if the request should be denied. If no 
match is found there, the connection is allowed. All requests, both successful and 
unsuccessful can be logged, providing another layer of filtering and security [GaOO]. 
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5. RESPONSE 
Immediately after an attack has been discovered, it is imperative to act as quickly as 
possible to respond to the threat. This response may be very different depending on the type 
of attack - a coordinated industrial espionage attack requires a response very different from a 
virus infection or DDoS experiment by a script-kiddy. Either way, it is important that system 
administrators analyze, patch, and improve the site based on information gathered after 
attacks. They must know how to interpret the evidence gathered from audit logs, firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems, and other detection devices, how to trace the attacker, as well as 
who to contact in stopping or apprehending a dangerous intruder. 
After enough evidence has been gathered from the secmty logs and IDS, 
administrators should begin tracing the steps of the intrusion, back to the attacker's 
computer. Often, an IP address or host name is available through the logs to begin the 
search. Hackers often use intermediate servers to launch an attack, so this may not be where 
the attacker originated, but it can help identify the path chosen. It can also alert the managers 
of other systems who are oblivious to the fact that their systems were used in the attack. 
There are many tools available to help track and identify hosts. Traceroute shows the hops 
taken by packets to reach their destination. Whois identifies who owns a site. Nslookup 
will reverse the IP address and return the host name. This information can sometimes 
pinpoint access points to the Internet that was used by the hacker, and reveal which Internet 
service provider (ISP) he is using. Several calls to them may temporarily close the attacker's 
entry point. Conducting a ping command determines if the attacking IP is active and online. 
This may not be conclusive evidence that a site is up, however, because many administrators 
block ICMP traffic to prevent DoS attacks. The finger command can determine who is 
currently logged onto a system that attacked you. Most of the time administrators tum this 
service off, so it usually does not produce any information about the system users. 
Automating these into scripts for minimal keyboard entry can speed the information recovery 
process. Anonymous surfing to the domain of the attacking host, or searching for 
information on the host and your system through major search engines may yield evidence of 
hacker activity harbored (knowingly or unknowingly) by the attacking site, or hostility 
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toward the local site. Searching USENET traffic may reveal other people who are reporting 
activity from the same system in security newsgroups, or more information about the specific 
attackers. If any postings were added by the hacker, header information from the posting 
may reveal his true location, and other postings by that same user may reveal more 
personally identifying information. Sometimes when hackers leave their alias behind after an 
attack, this may be a helpful means of discovery. Hopefully from this process, we can collect 
information about the numbers and sophistication level of hackers and possibly some 
candidates for the attack. Knowing whether the local site was singled out for an attack as 
opposed to being randomly selected will affect the level of concern in assessing a threat. To 
check for postings ofrecent attacks, the sites www.sans.org and www.securityfocus.com are 
excellent resources. [LeOO] provides a more in-depth look at the information discovery 
process. 
Once enough information is gathered, it is time to respond. Virus infections are 
perhaps the most prevalent security breach on machines where e-mail is used. Prevention 
through use of anti-virus software should render most viruses ineffective by catching and 
cleaning the infected files before their payload has a chance to proceed. If the virus 
definition files are up to date and there is still anomalous activity, a new virus may have been 
detected, and the auction site may be the first to report it. If this is the case, the company that 
produced the anti-virus software should be contacted immediately, with information on what 
symptoms the virus produced, how and when it entered the system, and any other 
information that may help in isolating the problem. Many anti-virus packages provide 
advanced heuristic scanning to detect new unnamed viruses even allows you to upload the 
new virus to their site for analysis. The contact information is usually provided in the help 
menu of the anti-virus software. Contacting CERT may provide some information on how 
prevalent the virus is, can help coordinate a countermeasure to extinguish the virus, and can 
help put extra pressure on the anti-virus company to develop a cure immediately. 
Simple intrusion may not constitute an aggressive stance in the area of law 
enforcement if it can be determined that no harm was caused besides unauthorized access (no 
access to the database or defacement of W eh pages) since it may be expensive to prosecute, 
and will not draw the attention of law enforcement for small offenses. This should definitely 
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note, however, that there is a security vulnerability that must be patched immediately. For 
insider sabotage, companies have more control of the situation if the person is still employed 
in some position there. If he is not, and still has access to the system, the local authorities 
should be contacted both in the area of the site and the perpetrator's locality. 
Oftentimes, staying current on the latest OS and security patches will prevent many 
unauthorized entries to the system. When a new security vulnerability is detected that was 
not fixed by the latest patch, it is time to contact the vendor of the product. A good practice 
to follow is after calling and e-mailing them with the vulnerability, allow them one week to 
respond. If they don't respond within that time, post the information to a security 
vulnerability list such as CERT or securityfocus.com where public attention can be brought 
to the problem. If they do respond, give them an appropriate amount of time to fix the 
vulnerability, which can depend on the vulnerability and the product. Post to the list if they 
don't respond within the allotted time. In the cases where the product is no longer supported 
or if the vulnerability is being active exploited and not informing the security community 
immediately would cause more harm than good, then it may be wise to post the exploit 
information to the list. Also, in this case, it may be beneficial to post to a site that will not 
wait for the vendor's update to be release, rather than listing the information and waiting a 
long time before the vulnerability is fixed and a patch is made available. 
Intrusions resulting in theft of proprietary or sensitive information, as well as threats 
and extortion are prime targets for FBI investigation. Report any illegal or malicious 
activities to the local FBI office (www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm) or the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The FBI has established the NIPC to serve as a 
threat assessment, law enforcement investigation and response entity. Nearly four years ago, 
no agents were funded specifically to handle computer crime. At the beginning of 2000, the 
bureau had over 200 nationwide [ECTOO]. Identifying the type of attack and preparing a cost 
estimate of the damages done is important since cost often affects how quickly to what level 
they will respond to charges. "If there is destruction or loss or theft of data, if there is a loss 
of$5,000 or more for a nongovernment nonfmancial institution, if there's been a root-level 
compromise or a DoS, you should call," says Doris Gardner, supervisory special agent in 
charge of the FBI's Charlotte, N.C., Regional Computer Crime Squad [MaOl]. Federal 
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agents will track entry points, contact ISPs, pore over security logs, monitor hacking 
channels and contact owners of each machine hit. Federal agents have investigate skills, 
forensic knowledge, access to attaches in foreign countries, and have established 
relationships with large and small Internet companies. They can also build a case by 
combining your information with those of other cybercrime victims. When you need it, they 
can find a translator for international investigations. These are cababilites beyond the reach 
of most companies. The FBI has contact information and incident reports available through 
their NIPC website [NIPCO 1]. 
In these cases, extra copies of recent logs should be retained immediately to prevent 
them from being overwritten and to provide a quick submission of evidence to the 
investigative team. Any host that is used by an attacker should also be contacted immediately 
and asked to backup their recent security logs for evidence. Notify that company of the 
intrusion and have them identify and shut down the security hole by cooperating with the 
company with information obtained through local security audits. In too many cases, log 
records are deleted or overwritten within days or even hours, so moving quickly is essential. 
If the records are gone, not much else can be done to catch an attacker. Also, the process of 
obtaining court orders requiring companies to disclose their records is slow in comparison to 
how fast the data logs are flushed. In some cases, if the logs reveal that an attack comes from 
uncooperative countries, the investigation may come to a dead-end. 
But the risk for hackers is increasing. The FBI and law enforcement are applying 
more resources to catch hackers, since society is demanding it now that the cost of attacks is 
increasing. Penalties for attacks are also likely to increase since extensive damages can be 
caused by simple attack scripts. Damages and costs involve more than just direct losses from 
stolen files and down time. There are all of the hours that businesses spend dealing with the 
consequences of the crime, as well as extra expenses businesses did not expect to spend when 
they beef up their security after being a victim. 
DoS and DDoS attacks are another field where FBI assistance is helpful in finding 
and prosecuting the offenders. If the local site is used to stage DDoS attack or used as a 
staging ground for other attacks, it is important to determine the role of the tools installed on 
the system. The pieces found may provide information that is useful in locating and 
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disabling other parts of distributed attack networks. When the tools are discovered, contact 
the victim servers immediately to alert them of the attack and where it may be coming from. 
Contacting the victim site is an act of good faith that the security team is trying to help stop 
the problem. If local security is compromised due to inattention to security issues, it is 
possible that the site may share liability for damages caused to victim sites. Currently 
companies are not considered negligent if their systems are broken into because of weak 
security, and then used as a staging ground for an attack [BaOO]. But it is only a matter of 
time before the precedent is set. Anyone can sue over any matter, and we may see some suits 
where the plaintiff hopes that the sued party will settle rather than pay lawyers to fight the 
case. However, lawsuits are more likely to emerge from violations of individuals' privacy 
and compromise of databases containing financial or sensitive information that should not be 
revealed. This is also very damaging publicity. Managers, when they are allocating 
administrator time and resources toward security, must understand that security is an ongoing 
process and not just a one-time fix. When administrators are pressed for time and resources, 
operational concerns and functionality take priority over securing systems. Planning funds 
for additional security resources and time can alleviate some problems during a crisis. 
In the event of a DDoS attack, where the local site is the victim, notify the owners of 
the IP addresses involved in the attack - often they are not aware that their site was 
compromised and used to launch the assault. The IP addresses of the computers should be 
evident in the logs. Due to the network congestion caused by DDoS attacks, communications 
may be unreliable via the Internet. The security policy should include emergency out-of-
band communications or access to a secondary network for contacting upstream network 
operators or emergency response teams in the event of a debilitating attack. 
Auction sites can also become a victim of a high number of fraud cases if they don't 
establish measures to lessen and respond to the risk. Fraud that takes place between users of 
an auction site doesn't affect the site directly other than through administrative time spent in 
handling crises that arise, but indirectly it lowers the chance that users will return to the site 
to do business when they feel that their transactions are not protected. 
A fraud response page on the site can help ease worries from users and provide them 
with a step-by-step process for reporting and closing fraud cases. It should encourage users 
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to provide feedback about the offender through the sites feedback policy and contact the 
auction site to see if the accused is likely to pay up. This also allows the site to flag and 
suspend the accounts of users who persist in committing fraudulent acts. Also, individual 
users do not have access to personal data about the accused and cannot contact that person 
without help from the auction site. The auction site could then turn over identifying 
information after determining that the charges are indeed valid, or refer the case for third-
party mediation. When mediation fails to reach a conclusion, the victim may wish to contact 
local law enforcement in the area of the offending user or business. If these measures fail, 
there are other recourses for the scammed. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for one, has not only attacked traditional 
ploys like pyramid and credit repair schemes, but has brought suits against pagejacking, 
modem hijacking, e-mail marketing fraud, and other hi-tech schemes that take advantage of 
the Internet. They developed Project Safebid to encourage local, state and federal law 
enforcement cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of Internet auction fraud. The 
FTC' s Consumer Sentinel fraud database coordinates law enforcement efforts, and provide 
secure access to over 220,000 consumer complaints for over 200 law enforcement 
organizations across the U.S. and Canada. Through this database, the FTC has tracked 
complaints about auction fraud which escalated from about 100 in 1997 to over 10,000 in 
1999 [FTCOO]. To help educate consumers about Internet auctions, the FTC is disseminating 
Internet Auctions: A Guide for Buyers and Sellers, which offers tips for buyers to protect 
themselves against fraud and for sellers to make transactions as smooth and successful as 
possible. The guide advises users to contact the FTC for more information or to file a 
complaint. To address the increasing problem of"borderless" Internet fraud that can affect 
consumers in every country, the Commission has begun sharing its database information 
when requested by enforcement officials armmd the world. Such information sharing among 
countries is necessary to coordinate law enforcement efforts. 
Other organizations, such as the Internet Fraud Watch can help consumers distinguish 
between legitimate and fraudulent promotions and route reports to the appropriate law 
enforcement agencies. When legitimate businesses are involved, they may be more willing 
to cooperate when a bad report to the Better Business Bureau is filed by a user. Failure to 
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deliver goods is even classified as mail fraud and could be prosecuted by the U.S. Postal 
Service. In one example, a California man was convicted of mail fraud for posting $37,000 
worth of electronics on Ebay and then failing to deliver. [PCWO 1] describes other 
organizations, such as the Internet Scambusters, National Fraud Center, Internet Fraud 
Complaint Center, and Web Police, who can help victims of fraud in their quest for justice. 
75 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
No amount of security is perfect, and none will ever be. The main goal of security 
though, is not perfection, but a balanced set of policies that makes the chance of invasion 
minimal. The best security policy is one that implements not only mechanisms to provide 
prevention of attacks and modification of data, but follows this up with detection of 
malicious activity through several separate means, and finally provides a measure of 
response to that activity. 
Traditional crimes - vandalism, theft, and corporate espionage - have followed 
businesses into the on-line realm. Like their real-world counterparts, the on-line variation 
must be dealt with in a similar fashion - prevention if possible, but when that fails, backing it 
with detection and response. Encryption is good, prevents many attacks, and is 
mathematically sound, but it can only do so much. The encryption mathematics, like other 
well-intended security protocols can be perfect in theory, but in practice often leave gaping 
holes in the armor of a site. By balancing several different means of preventing and 
detecting hackers, the probability of all of these systems failing or being compromised is 
minimal. Thus, after an attack does occur, enough forensic evidence can be gathered to 
prepare a well-documented response to the appropriate authorities. 
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